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Summary
This thesis investigates how political or religious leaders have an impact on several
socio-economic outcomes in two different countries, the United States and Italy.
In the first empirical chapter I analyse how the race of a politician can have
an impact on the incidence of crime. I answer this question by focusing on large
US cities, where active participation in the political life of the African-American
candidates has undergone a strong upsurge since 1965. In order to deal with the
endogeneity of black candidates to city characteristics, a regression discontinuity is
used, exploiting the multi-racial elections decided by a narrow margin of victory.
The results show that the number of motor vehicles stolen increases considerably
the year after the election of an African-American candidate. I investigate, as a
possible channel of influence, how police employment responds to the election of a
black mayor, finding a negative effect the year after the electoral race.
The second empirical chapter studies how electoral outcomes can shape individu-
als’ migration decisions. Using the Italian mayoral elections data from 2001 to 2014,
I study how foreign citizens’ internal migration with a regular residency permit in
North Italy can be affected by the election of a mayor affiliated to the Northern
League (Lega Nord) party, a far-right political movement characterised by a strong
federalist, populist and anti-immigration ideology. To deal with the endogeneity of
the Northern League to city characteristics, a sharp regression discontinuity is used.
Overall the results show that a mayor affiliated to the Northern League party causes
an increase in the foreign out-migration rate one year after the election.
The third empirical chapter investigates the impact of papal visits to Italian
provinces on abortions and live births from 1979 to 2012. Using an event study
methodology, we find a strong decrease in the number of abortions following papal
visits. This effect commences at about the 3rd month and persists until about the
11th month after the visits. However, we find no significant change in the number
of live births. We argue that a fall in the incidence of unplanned pregnancies best
explains our results. This fall appears to be concentrated among married women, a
demographic that shows the biggest jump in religiosity when the pope visits.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Political and religious leaders play a crucial role in shaping economic, social and
political life through the set of policies adopted or by changing beliefs and percep-
tions of the population. Politicians have great potential to influence several aspects
of everyday life, such as education, housing or the incidence of crime. Religious
leaders’ role, nowadays, is not only circumscribed to the diffusion of moral and spir-
itual values but they take a strong stance on important themes such as inclusive
economic growth or climate change (The Economist, 2011).
Scholars have long debated the importance of politicians’ identity. On the one
hand, seminal studies conducted by Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) theorised
that competing political leaders are forced to offer the same set of policies in order
to capture the median voter and win the election. On the other, recent evidence has
largely shown that specific traits of the identity of a politician, such as partisanship,
race or gender exert a strong influence on the set of policies enacted.
A relatively new literature has focused on the political power or the persuasive
influence exerted by religious leaders. For example, Chaney (2013) using centuries
of data relative to the Nile floods shows that during floods, which are deviant to
normal flood levels of the Nile river, allocations to religious structures, compared
to secular structures, increased while religious authorities were less likely to be re-
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placed. Stroebel and Van Benthem (2013) have offered direct evidence on the impact
of local bishops on HIV transmission in Kenya.
The cultural and social values enclosed in the identity of political and religious
leaders are determinant for the type of policies implemented or the choices made by
people. In this thesis I investigate how two specific traits of a politician’s identity,
namely race and partisanship, and the exposure to the visit of the Pope, perceived
as the emblem of the Catholic doctrine, affect the incidence of crime in America,
the decision to migrate and the choice to undergo an abortion operation in Italy,
respectively.
The relationship between race and crime in the United States is a topic of public
controversy. West (2010) shows that the incarceration rate of African-Americans is
disproportionately higher than their representation in the general population. From
2013, several activist movements were founded with the purpose of campaigning
against violence and systemic racism towards black people. In the first empirical
chapter I analyse how the election of an African-American mayor affects the incid-
ence of crime, focusing on large US cities. Previous research in sociology or political
science has mostly studied how the election of African-American mayors negatively
correlates with the incidence of episodes of interracial violence or killings and events
of fatal violence against police officers and civilians, due to the adoption of measures
aimed at the attenuation of the perception of injustice against ethnic minorities, such
as the use of special selection standards for minority applicants, the enforcement of
formal departmental restrictions on the use of fatal force or the recruitment of more
black officers (Jacobs and Wood, 1999; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2002; Stucky, 2003,
2012). My work complements and contributes to the aforementioned literature ad-
dressing a causal link between the election of an African-American mayor and crime
in the US.
In order to overcome potential sources of endogeneity, the identification strategy
16
relies on a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD), analysing the multiracial
electoral races decided by a narrow margin of victory. The results show that the
number of motor vehicles stolen increases considerably the year after the election
of an African-American candidate. I investigate, as a possible channel of influence,
how police employment responds to the election of a black mayor, finding a negative
effect the year following the electoral race.
The second empirical chapter studies how electoral outcomes can influence in-
dividuals’ migration decisions. In the last decade, Italy has witnessed a rise in
“anti-foreigners” sentiment, instigated by the growth of far-right political parties,
such as Lega Nord, exploiting the effects of the economic crisis and, more recently,
the migration ermergency from North-Africa.1 Using data relative to the mayoral
elections in Italy occurred from 2001 to 2014, I investigate the causal effect of the
election of a candidate affiliated to the Northern League (Lega Nord) party on the
internal migration of foreign citizens with a regular residency permit, using a re-
gression discontinuity design to isolate possible sources of endogeneity. The results
indicate an increase in the internal out-migration rate in response to the election of
a Northern League candidate. I provide evidence in favour of the idea of a decreased
perception of social inclusion towards foreign citizens as a possible factor influencing
the migration decision, contributing to the new developments in the psychological
field, theorising the concept of “ideological migration”.
In the third empirical chapter, joint with Dr. Pathania, we investigate the im-
pact of the papal visits to the Italian provinces on abortions from 1979 to 2012.
Italy is one of the five countries with the largest Catholic population (Pew Research
Center, 2013) and the country with the highest number of papal visits. The Catholic
Church has historically played a strong influence on the Italian political system and
society. For example, in the 1970s and in the 1980s, important laws on themes such
1See, for example, Murgese (2015) or Politi (2017).
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as divorce or abortion were strongly opposed by one of the major Italian parties,
Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party), backed by the Pope and the
Italian Bishop’s Conference (CEI)2. Nowadays, the Pontiff represents a compelling
figure for important themes such as gay marriage or euthanasia (The Economist,
2007).
Using an event study methodology, we show a decrease in the number of abor-
tions from the 1st to the 4th quarter of year after the papal visits. However, we find
no significant change in the number of live births. Our findings cannot be satisfact-
orily explained by heightened stigma attached to abortions. Instead, we argue that
a fall in the incidence of unplanned pregnancies best explains our results. This fall
appears to be concentrated among married women.
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 examines the impact of African-
American mayors on crime. Chapter 3 analyses how the election of a Northern
League mayor in Italy affects foreign internal migration. Chapter 4 analyses how
the papal visits to the Italian provinces affects the number of abortions and live
births. Chapter 5, finally, concludes.
2See Wertman (1982).
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Chapter 2
Politics and Crime in Black &
White
2.1 Introduction
In 1983 the magazine Ebony, in an article about the incidence of crime in Amer-
ican cities, emphasised the fundamental role played by African-American mayors
in reducing crime with respect to the cities ruled by a white mayor1. According
to the periodical, the possible factors behind this success were to be found in the
black mayors’ social and cultural background, which endowed the African-American
officers with a special sensitivity (p. 116) that allowed them to tackle these kinds
of problems more effectively than a non-black mayor. This, in turn, explained how
the combination of measures aimed at improving the relationship between police
and the black community2, and the development of specific crime prevention pro-
grammes, resulted in such a strong and considerable reduction of the crime rates:
for example, in cities such as Atlanta or Gary the incidence of crime fell by 6% and
11.2% respectively, compared to the previous year.
Although non-scientific and aimed at targeting public opinion, this article reflected
a debate started in the 1970s when, in response to an increasing number of elected
1 Can black mayor stop crime? (Leavy, 1983)
2 The author of the article listed the citizens’ participation in the police-department’s decision-
making process or their inclusion in citizens advisory committees and civilian review boards.
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African-American mayors, political scientists and sociologists began to analyse what
were the main lines along which a black city differed from a white city : Poinsett
(1970), Nelson and Meranto (1977), Campbell and Feagin (1975), Nelson (1978),
Keller (1978), Karnig and Welch (1980), assessed, mostly through case-studies, the
main factors leading the African-American candidates to succeed against a white
opponent and the type of policies adopted by a black mayor in contrast to those
cities where a white official was elected.3
My work takes a step in this direction, studying whether the race of a politician in
large American cities has an impact on several categories of property and violent
crimes. The motivation behind this study is twofold. On one hand, contrary to the
works of Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957), according to which the type of policies
implemented by a politician merely reflect the preferences of the median voter, a
recent array of studies has largely shown that the politicians’ preferences play a cru-
cial role in determining the set of economic and political measures adopted (Besley
and Coate (1997); Levitt (1996)). In this case, if the politicians’ preferences differ
by race4, the number of crimes in a city ruled by a black mayor might differ from a
city where a white mayor is elected in response to the adoption of different policies.
On the other hand, the relationship between race, crime and criminal justice in
American society today attracts the interests of academics, media and public opin-
ion and, non-ultimately, it has been the cause of social tensions, which has led to
the creation of activist movements and protests across the whole of America. Un-
derstanding how and the possible mechanisms through which crime responds to the
election of an African-American mayor can offer a new insight on this phenomenon.
To determine how the race of a politician can affect crime, I link the data collected
3 As acknowledged by Hopkins and McCabe (2012), due to the low number of observations, a
unique consensus on the relationship between the mayor’s race and the type of policies adopted
was never reached. Some studies found no differences between a city ruled by a white and or a
black mayor (Nelson, 1978); other works documented African-American mayors’ predilection for
social welfare policies coupled with a reduction in police spending (Karnig and Welch, 1980) while
other research presented evidence of higher police spending but no impact on welfare spending
when a black mayor was elected (Keller, 1978).
4According to Nelson and Meranto (1977), black mayors were more likely to be concerned
with the living conditions of the black population, channelling the “available resources toward the
alleviation of poverty and hopelessness in the black community”.
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by the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting programme to the interracial election dataset
constructed by Vogl (2014). This dataset provides information on the race, partis-
anship and votes of the two top-candidates running for mayoral elections between
1965 and 2010 in American cities whose population in 1960 was at least 50,000.
In order to overcome potential sources of endogeneity related to the election of
an African-American mayor, the identification strategy relies on a sharp regression
discontinuity design (RDD), analysing the multi-racial electoral races decided by
a narrow margin of victory. However, if a narrowly-decided election approximates
a randomised experiment, as pointed out by McCrary (2008), this might not be
a sufficient condition to ensure randomness in the outcomes of competitive elec-
tions. Following Vogl (2014), I check whether the African-American mayors exhibit
a systematic advantage over the non-black candidates. As the test will show, in
the sample characterised by cities outside the Southern States we can consider the
election of an African-American mayor in a close multi-racial contest as good as ran-
dom; unfortunately this is unlikely to happen in the South, where black candidates
are more likely to win an electoral race decided by a narrow-margin of victory.
My main findings show that the election of a black mayor in a close multi-racial
contest has a strong and positive impact on the number of motor vehicle thefts one
year after the electoral race took place. On the other hand, other types of crimes
do not seem to respond to the election of an African-American mayor. I follow the
study on crime rates with an assessment of the possible channels through which car
theft can be affected by the election of a black mayor, implementing a regression
discontinuity design where the dependent variables are the total number of police
employees and the number of police officers per 1,000 inhabitants in the year fol-
lowing the electoral race. Coherently with the economics of crime literature, the
increase in the number of car thefts might be explained by a decrease in the number
of policemen the year after the election of an African-American mayor.
In order to gather further evidence in favour of my results, several robustness checks
are performed: I increase the number of data points by looking at the total number
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of motor vehicle thefts in the two years subsequent to the election; I adopt a different
estimator to test if my results still hold when a non-parametric strategy is adopted
and, finally, I isolate the “race” effect from the “ethnic minority status” effect by
looking at the election of an Asian-American or Hispanic mayor against a white
runner-up only. The evidence emerging from these tests corroborates my original
findings, pointing to an increase in the number of motor vehicles stolen following
the election of a black mayor decided by a narrow margin of victory.
This paper contributes to different literatures: firstly, several studies in the economic
literature have linked some aspects of a politician’s identity such as gender, party
affiliation, religion or race to different economic and social outcomes. However, to
the best of my knowledge, this represents the first study addressing a causal relation-
ship between the election of an African-American mayor and the incidence of crime.
Secondly, the sociological and criminological literature have mostly focused on how
the election of a black mayor correlates to the number of murders or the number of
interracial killings, in order to test the classic social disorganisation theory, whereas
in this paper it is my intention to establish a causal nexus, differentiating between
violent and property crimes.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 offers a brief summary
of the literature to which my study is linked; Section 2.3 describes the data used
throughout the paper and provides some descriptive statistics; Section 2.4 explains
the methodology and the econometric model adopted; Section 2.5 shows the main
results, Section 2.6 discusses the channels through which a black mayor can affect
the number of motor vehicle thefts, Section 2.7 tests the robustness of my results
and, finally, Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This work is strictly related to that strand of research conducted in criminology and
sociology that has put a strong emphasis on how the race of a mayoral candidate
can affect criminal behaviour. Also, more broadly, it is related to the research in
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political economy that has examined how the election of an African-American mayor
can affect different outcomes.
Jacobs and Wood (1999), in their study on the incidence of interracial violence in
American cities, claim i) a positive correlation between the election of a black mayor
and the rates of white killings of blacks and, ii) a negative correlation between the
presence of an African-American mayor and black killings of whites. On the other
hand, Wadsworth and Kubrin (2004) do not find any significant relationship between
interracial killings and black mayors. Jacobs and Carmichael (2002) present evidence
of a lower occurrence of violent episodes against policemen in those cities where a
black mayor is elected; this is because black mayors reduce the perception of injustice
against minorities by increasing the number of black policemen.
Stucky (2003) explores whether the form of government (mayor vs city manager),
the city council electoral systems (district-based electoral systems vs cities with at-
large elections), the presence of partisanship elections and the race of local officials
can affect the number of murders. The author shows that there exists a significant
and negative correlation between the city council electoral system (i.e. the presence
of district-based city council representation) and crime, and mixed evidence on the
relationship between the race of elected officials and delinquency. The impact of
black city council representation on crime is not statistically significant, whereas
the presence of a black mayor is associated with a reduction of 20.6% in violent
crimes when compared with a city where a non-black mayor wins the electoral race.
Stucky (2012) finds a negative correlation between the share of black residents and
black violent crime arrest rates in those cities where an African-American mayor is
elected.
Nye et al. (2015), studying whether a black mayor rewards members from their own
ethnic group, find that black employment and labour force participation rise relative
to white employment as a result of the election of an African-American officer.
Hopkins and McCabe (2012) show that narrow black electoral victories do not induce
many policy changes with few exceptions: a city with a narrow black victory will
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reduce the city’s share of employees at the police department by 2.9 percentage
points, while, for police pay, they find a 3.6 percentage point decline in police pay
as a share of total pay. Vogl (2014) studies the nature of multi-racial elections that
occurred in the US from 1965 to 2010. According to the author, close black victories
were more likely to occur than close black losses in the Southern States, involved
higher turnout, and were more likely to be followed by subsequent black victories.
Elections contested by black and non-black candidates have also been studied at a
wider political level; Washington (2006), for example, finds that black candidates
running for Senate and gubernatorial elections increase voter turnout.
This paper is also linked to that branch of research in political economy studying
how different aspects of a politician’s identity can affect political and economic
outcomes. Lee (2008), exploiting data relative to the elections to the US House
of Representatives (1946-1998), presents strong evidence that incumbency has a
causal positive effect on the probability of winning the subsequent elections. Dal Bo´
et al. (2009) find that legislators who hold power for longer become more likely to
have relatives entering Congress in the future; Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) show
that in large American cities there exists no significant relationship between the
mayor’s party and the size of city government, the allocation of public spending
and crime rates. Other studies have focused on the gender of local officials rather
than the party to which they belong. Beaman et al. (2009) and Beaman et al.
(2012) show that exposure to a female politician reduces gender stereotypes and
influences adolescent girls’ career aspirations and educational attainment; Clots-
Figueras (2011) studies the impact of female political representation in India on
public goods, policy and expenditure. Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012) show that
in municipalities headed by female mayors, the probability of early termination of the
legislature is higher. Clots-Figueras (2012) finds that female political representation
increases the probability of an individual attaining primary education in urban areas;
Ferreira and Gyourko (2014) replicate their first work focusing on the gender of US
mayors without finding any significant difference between cities ruled by women or
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men. Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2014) show that a 10 percentage point increase in
women’s representation in state legislatures in India results in a 2.1 percentage point
reduction in neonatal mortality. Finally, economists have recently begun to analyse
how the religious identity of a politician can affect human capital accumulation:
Bhalotra et al. (2014) find that increasing the political representation of Muslims
has a positive effect on health and education outcomes in the district where the
legislator is elected; Meyersson (2014) finds that Turkish cities exposed to an Islamic
party are characterised by a higher female secular high school education.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1 Election Data
The interracial election data provide information on the mayoral elections that oc-
curred between 1965 and 2010 in 122 large US cities whose population in 1960 was
at least 50,000. The data were generously provided by Vogl (2014), who expanded
the initial data provided by Ferreira and Gyourko (2009)5 using newspaper archives,
elections bureaux, and websites to address the race of the first two mayoral candid-
ates. For each election it is possible to establish the partisanship of the first two
candidates, the incumbency status of the mayor, the turnout associated with each
election, and the specific form of local government (city manager vs mayor-council
system).
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the election sample. Overall, 318 out of
1,571 elections are interracial; the electoral races involving two African-American
candidates are 83, denoting a disproportionate prevalence of non-African-American
candidates. On average a city experienced 12.98 elections from 1965 to 2010; the
average number of interracial elections is 2.63. Finally, 54% of the cities have been
ruled at least once by a black mayor.
In Appendix A, Figure A.1-A.3 show different aspects related to the proportion
5The authors originally mailed a survey to the election office of every US city that directly
elects its mayor with a population greater than 25,000.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics - Elec-
tion sample
# Elections 1571
# Interracial Elections 318
# Elections - same race 1085
# Black-Black elections 83
# Black mayors 277
# Non-Black mayors 1293
Average elections/city 12.98
Average Interracial Elections/city 2.63
Share cities with black winners 54%
# Cities 122
Source: Author’s calculations based on data
from Vogl (2014).
of elections involving the participation of African-American candidates over the
period 1965-2010. Figure A.1 presents the share of elections with at least one black
candidate from 1965 to 2010, denoting a positive trend from the 1970s, which became
flatter in the 2000s. Figure A.2 graphs the number of elections won since 1965 by
an African-American candidate over the total number of elections that occurred in
a given year, whereas Figure A.3 reports the number of electoral races won by an
African-American candidate as a share of the number of elections involving a black
against a non-black candidate. In this case, multi-racial contests are more likely
to be won by a non-black candidate as the range of black victories is always below
50%.
2.3.2 Crime Data
The data on crime, expressed per 1,000 inhabitants, are provided by the Uni-
form Crime Reporting (UCR) reports issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). The FBI records crime statistics from law enforcement agencies across the
US that have voluntarily participated in the UCR programme since 1930. The UCR
programme collects statistics relative to violent crimes (murder and non-negligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) and property crimes
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(burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft).6 Although on the one hand the
UCR represents one of the best sources providing data at the city level on a yearly
basis in the United States, on the other hand, the data collection process might
be affected by measurement error. This, however, under the classical measurement
error assumptions, will not bias the point estimates, resulting in inflated standard
errors. Crimes are reported at US Nation and State level since 1960 and, starting
from 1985, also at city level; this is why my analysis cannot exploit the elections
that occurred between 1965 and 1983.
The FBI does not include data on violent and property crimes if the collection
methodology followed by a police department does not comply with UCR guidelines.
In order to minimise potential measurement error, I dropped two cities from my final
sample, Augusta and Charlotte, as the data on crimes are provided at County level
(Richmond and Mecklenburg, respectively). Finally, it is common practice for the
police departments to collect and submit all the data to the FBI in December in order
to take into account the total number of crimes that occurred over the entire solar
year. However, for 74 observations the data recorded refer to the number of crimes
that occurred in a shorter span of time; also in this case, observations were deleted.
Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A group the American States and the cites from
the election sample into four macro-regions, according to the definition provided
by the US census;7 for each region the average and relative standard deviation
from 1985 to 2010 of different types of violent and property crimes expressed per
1,000 inhabitants is computed. With the only exception being robberies in the
Northeast and burglaries in the South, we do not observe much variation across
the US regions over time. As expected, property crimes are more frequent than
violent crimes; urban crimes, regardless of the particular category considered, are,
6See Appendix A for a rigorous definition of the different types of crime provided by the FBI.
7Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania; Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin,
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota; South: Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West
Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma/Indian Ter-
ritory, Texas; West: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming,
Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington.
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on average, higher than crimes reported at State level.
2.3.3 Municipal Characteristics
Table 2.2: Sample Representativeness
Election Sample US Cities
(1) (2)
Population 417824 10896
(862196) (88599)
% Pop < 18 26.61 27.18
(3.92) (6.51)
% Pop > 65 12.15 16.24
(2.49) (7.82)
% Black Pop. 31.19 6.85
(20.72) (15.85)
Median family income 42756 43489
(10169) (16913)
% Poor families 14.99 11.01
(5.68) (8.75)
% Unemployment 8.38 6.05
(3.02) (4.87)
% education 76.61 76.70
(7.94) (11.97)
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the 2000 US Census of Pop. and Housing.
Note: Each entry reports the mean and standard deviation relative to several city charac-
teristics. Column (1) presents descriptives for the election sample while Column (2) reports
descriptives for all the US cities.
The US Census of Population and Housing delivers information, collected with
decennial frequency, on the municipal characteristics used as controls in the following
sections: total population, share of black population, share of population younger
than 18, share of population older than 65, share of population that completed at
least secondary education, median family income expressed in 1999 dollars, the share
of poor families living in a given city, and the unemployment rate at city level.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics on the representativeness of the election
sample. The cities in column (1) are more populous than the typical jurisdiction
(column 2); the share of people younger than 18 is similar across the two different
groups, while the share of inhabitants older than 65 is 4 percentage points lower
in the election sample if compared to column (2). The share of African-American
28
inhabitants is considerably higher in the election sample; on the other hand, we do
not observe a strong difference between the two groups of cities in terms of income.
The election sample is characterised, on average, by a higher share of poor families
and a higher unemployment rate, whereas the share of people with at least high
school education is basically identical in the two samples.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
The identification strategy, as anticipated in Section 2.1, is based on a parametric
sharp regression discontinuity (RDD).8 In order to exploit the RD design, I convey
my analysis on the so called close elections : identifying the impact of a black mayor
on crime could be biased by city specific factors, but, for elections decided by a
narrow margin, which candidate will win is likely to be determined by pure chance.
In order to evaluate how the election of a black mayor can affect crime, the following
model is adopted:
crimec,t+1 = α + βBlackMayorc,t + f(MVc,t) + γBlackMayorc,t × f(MVc,t) + uc,t+1 (2.1)
where the dependent variable crimec,t+1 can be either property or violent crime
per 1,000 inhabitants for city c in the year following the mayoral election; the
treatment indicator, BlackMayorc,t, is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the elec-
tion winner in city c at time t is African-American and 0 otherwise; f(MVc,t) is
a first order polynomial function, which controls for the linear term of the margin
of victory9,10, (defined as the difference between the black candidate’s votes and
the non-black candidate’s votes divided by their sum), while the interaction term
BlackMayorc,t × f(MVc,t) allows the running variable to adopt different slopes on
8 See Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Van Der Klaauw (2008), or Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a
comprehensive survey on RDD.
9 The literature on RD has not yet reached a unique consensus on the choice of the functional
form of the running variable. According to Imbens and Lemieux (2008) the polynomial with
the lowest AIC should be used; Porter (2003) argues that odd polynomial orders have better
econometric properties.
10 For robustness purposes, in this paper I present estimates of model 2.1 using different higher
order polynomial specifications.
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both sides of the cut-off.
Provided that the running variable is measured prior to the start of treatment, the
cut-off point is determined independently of the running variable, and assignment to
treatment is entirely based on the candidate votes and the cut-off point, the internal
validity might still be threatened by the presence of vote manipulation by the win-
ning candidate. Hence, I follow McCrary (2008) to estimate possible discontinuities
in the distribution of the forcing variable: the presence of a statistically significant
discontinuity in the margin of victory around the cut-off would suggest that the
running variable has been subject to manipulation.
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Figure 2.1: Continuity of the running variable.
In figure 2.1, panel (a) shows the distribution of the margin of victory of an
African-American candidate against a white candidate for the entire sample; the
magnitude of the estimated log difference in height (0.61) and the relative standard
errors (0.33) confirm that the election of a black mayor in a close contest cannot
be considered as good as random; this is due to the presence of vote manipulation.
Hence, I disaggregate my sample into cities belonging to the Southern States and
cities belonging to the remaining regions. The estimated discontinuity in Figure 2.1
- panel (b), with a log difference equal to 1.32 and relative standard errors equal to
0.68, reinforces Vogl (2014) main results, which state that, in US Southern cities,
close black victories were more likely than close black losses, involved higher turnout
than close black losses, and were more likely to be followed by subsequent black vic-
tories. As suggested by Vogl (2014), these results are “consistent with the idea that
the historical exclusion of African-Americans from the political process makes them
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considerably more sensitive to mobilisation efforts than whites” (p. 109).
Finally, panel (c) in Figure 2.1 allows the conclusion that the election of an African-
American candidate in a close contest was not decided by vote manipulation in the
cities outside the Southern States (the estimated log difference is equal to 0.35 while
the relative standard errors are equal to 0.34). Therefore, for the purpose of my
analysis, I will focus on the non-Southern sample only, since the estimates of the
effect of a black mayor on crime would be biased in the Southern cities.
Table 2.3: Discontinuity in the Covariates.
β N
s.e.
(1) (2)
log(pop) −0.084 127
(0.33)
% ≤ 18 −0.865 127
(1.17)
% ≥ 65 0.594 126
(0.76)
% black 4.39 126
(4.36)
log(inc.) −0.015 126
(0.07)
% poor 0.463 124
(1.95)
% unemp. 0.702 124
(1.01)
education −2.224 124
(3.25)
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from
the US Census of Pop. and Housing.
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented
by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by
∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients, the
std. errors and the number of observations relat-
ive to the election of a black mayor on different
observable municipal characteristics. Std. errors
are clustered at city level.
As a last test to support the internal validity of the discontinuity design, I check
whether the distribution of the baseline covariates varies smoothly at the cut-off
point. Table 2.3 reports the RD estimates of model (2.1) using the municipal charac-
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teristics introduced in Section 2.3.3 as dependent variables11. Overall the municipal
characteristics do not seem to be affected by the treatment indicator. In order to
gather further evidence in favour of this result, I perform two more tests: I firstly
estimate model (2.1) for each covariate controlling for all the remaining municipal
characteristics and, following Lee and Lemieux (2010), I run a Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (SUR) model followed by a test for the discontinuity gaps in all questions
being zero12 (p. 331). The results, not reported here for brevity, confirm that the
municipal characteristics are not discontinuous around the cut-off.
2.5 Results
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Figure 2.2: The impact of the election of an African-American mayor on crime.
Figure 2.2 offers a preliminary graphical inspection where different types of
11See Appendix A, Figure A.4 for the distribution of the covariates around the threshold.
12 The test is robust across different polynomial specifications.
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crimes are plotted against the running variable, i.e. the margin of victory of the
candidates competing in an interracial mayoral election. The discontinuity observed
in panel (a) for the violent crime index, defined as the sum of the violent crimes
collected by the FBI, is mostly driven by rape (panel (c)), robbery (panel (d)) and,
to a minor extent, assault (panel (e)). The number of murders per 1,000 inhabit-
ants does not seem to be affected by the election of an African-American mayor.
Concerning property crimes, motor vehicle theft (panel (i)) and larceny (panel (h))
drive the discontinuity observed in the property crime index (panel (f)), whereas in
panel (g) we observe only a mild jump relative to burglary.
In order to establish whether the discontinuities observed in Figure 2.2 are stat-
istically significant, Table 2.4 presents the RD estimates relative to the election of
an African-American candidate in an interracial contest on several types of violent
(Panel A) and property crimes (Panel B), occurring in the year subsequent to the
electoral race.13 The first column reports the average and standard deviation of
each type of crime; the second column estimates model (2.1) without covariates;
in column (3) I control for city characteristics, mayor’s partisanship14, mayor’s in-
cumbency status, year and state fixed effects, while in column (4) I adopt a stricter
specification, adding year and city fixed effects to the set of municipal and mayoral
characteristics.
The RD estimates relative to the violent crimes reported in column (2) show
that the election of an African-American mayor has a positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect on the violent crime index, which is mostly driven by an increase of
1.972 robberies per 1,000 inhabitants. However, these results are not robust to the
inclusion of controls, year and state or city fixed effects, as shown in columns (3) and
(4). The impacts on the remaining violent crimes are not statistically significant,
regardless of the specification adopted.
13In Column (2) the number of observations is 112 for the violent crime index and rape and
127 for the remaining categories. In column (3) and (4) the number of observations is 109 for the
violent crime index and rape and 124 for the remaining categories.
14I include a dummy indicator equal 1 if the mayor is a democrat and 0 otherwise; a dummy
indicator equal 1 if the mayor is a republican and 0 otherwise and, finally, a dummy indicator
equal 1 if the mayor is independent and 0 otherwise (baseline category excluded in this case).
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Table 2.4: RD estimates of the impact of black mayor on crime
Average RD
(std)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Violent crime index 11.67 4.045∗ −0.098 −1.354
(7.14) (2.10) (2.17) (1.54)
Murder 0.16 0.024 0.016 −0.025
(0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Rape 0.60 0.166 0.019 −0.077
(0.36) (0.13) (0.15) (0.10)
Robbery 4.92 1.972∗ 0.224 0.133
(3.35) (1.11) (0.87) (0.69)
Assault 6.16 1.033 −1.599 −1.743∗∗∗
(4.59) (1.02) (1.08) (0.71)
Panel B
Property crime index 64.42 10.894 −9.478 −8.942
(31.41) (9.16) (12.26) (6.60)
Burglary 15.37 3.106 0.184 −2.201
(7.62) (2.85) (2.49) (2.46)
Larceny 39.08 1.941 −12.739 −9.643∗
(24.02) (5.90) (11.18) (5.64)
Motor vehicle theft 9.97 5.847∗∗∗ 3.077∗∗ 2.902∗∗
(7.18) (2.00) (1.37) (1.22)
Controls No Yes Yes
Year f.e. No Yes Yes
State f.e. No Yes No
City f.e. No No Yes
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level
by ∗∗∗. Column (1) presents the average and standard deviation in parentheses relative to each
crime category. Each entry in columns (2)-(4) reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative
to the election of a black mayor on different categories of violent (Panel A) and property crimes
(Panel B), using a flexible linear polynomial term in the margin of victory. Controls include city
and mayoral characteristics. Std. errors are clustered at city level.
In Panel B, RD coefficients and standard errors relative to the impact of the elec-
tion of a black mayor on property crimes are displayed. Column (2) shows that the
property crime index, defined as the sum of burglaries, larcenies and motor vehicle
thefts per 1,000 inhabitants, is not statistically different from a city where a non-
black mayor has been elected against an African-American candidate. Passing to the
single property crimes, the number of burglaries per 1,000 inhabitants is not affected
by the election of a black mayor winning a close multi-racial contest. As regards the
number of larcenies, in column (2) we see that the election of a black mayor in a
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close multi-racial contest does not have any statistically significant effect; my results
do not change when I include controls, state and year fixed effects (column 3), even
though the coefficient is now negative. Finally, in column (4) we find a negative and
statistically significant effect on the number of larcenies the year after the election
of an African-American mayor when I add year and city fixed effects to the set of
municipal and mayoral controls. Compared to column (3), the magnitude of the
coefficient shrinks in absolute value from 12.739 to 9.643 per 1,000 inhabitants.
Contrary to the previous cases, a strong, positive and significant impact is found on
the number of motor vehicles stolen: as we can see from column (2), the election of
a black officer in a close multi-racial contest increases the number of motor vehicle
thefts by 5.847 per 1,000 inhabitants; this effect turns out to be statistically signi-
ficant at the 1% level. The inclusion of city and mayoral characteristics, as well as
year and state fixed effects in column (3), reduces the magnitude of this effect to
3.077 per 1,000 inhabitants, which is now significant at the 5% level. The inclusion
of city fixed effects in column (4) reduces the coefficient slightly to 2.902 per 1,000
inhabitants and the relative standard errors; as in column (3), the coefficient is sig-
nificant at the 5% level. Comparing this coefficient to column (1), we can see that
the effect is quite substantial, since its size represents 29.11% of the yearly average
of the car theft category per 1,000 inhabitants.
In Appendix A for each crime category I re-estimate model (2.1) using different
polynomial specifications, in order to check if the results presented in Table 2.4 are
sensitive to the particular functional form adopted. Murders (Table A.4) and rapes
(Table A.5) per 1,000 inhabitants do not seem to be affected by the election of an
African-American mayor when non-linear polynomial terms in the margin of victory
are used. The same conclusions apply to the number of aggravated assaults per 1,000
inhabitants (Table A.7): the only exception is that, in column (3), the inclusion of
controls, year and city fixed effects makes the coefficient significant at the 1% level.
Unfortunately the statistical significance fades away when higher order polynomials
in the margin of victory are adopted. The sum of violent crimes in Table A.3, and
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the number of robberies per 1,000 inhabitants (Table A.6), present a positive and
statistically significant effect in six out of eight different functional forms adopted
when no controls are included (column 1). In columns (2) and (3), we can see that
this effect disappears when I add controls, year and state (column 2), or city fixed
effects (column 3).
As regards the property crime category, using different polynomial specifications
does not change the results relative to the property crime index and the number of
burglaries per 1,000 inhabitants, as we can see from Tables A.8 and A.9 respectively.
The impact of the election of an African-American mayor on the number of larcenies
per 1,000 inhabitants, as discussed in Table 2.4, disappears when I include higher
order polynomial terms in the margin of victory (Table A.10, column 3). Passing
to the number of motor vehicles stolen per 1,000 inhabitants, in Table A.11 we can
see that the particular choice of the functional form does not belie the evidence in
favour of an increase of this crime the year after the election of a black mayor. The
inclusion of controls, year and state fixed effects in column (2) reduces the magnitude
of the coefficients and the relative standard errors if compared to column (1); also
in this case, the election of an African-American remains statistically significant
regardless of the polynomial specifications used. Finally, with the exception of two
cases only, in column (3) the adoption of a more rigorous model with the inclusion of
city fixed effects does not wash away the statistical significance of the relationship
linking the election of a black mayor to the number of motor vehicles stolen per
1,000 inhabitants.
2.6 Discussion
In order to shed light on the channels through which the election of a black local
officer can affect this particular crime, I analyse whether the election of an African-
American mayor can have an impact on police employment. Following Becker
(1968), a decrease in the employment of police officers might reduce the opportunity
cost of crime, lowering the probability of detection and, eventually, imprisonment.
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In order to study this relationship, the Historical Data Base on Individual Local
Government Employment, released upon request by the US Census, was used. The
database contains over 220 employment variables for State and local government,
collected yearly for the period 1972-2010.15 For the purpose of this analysis, the
following model is estimated:
policec,t+1 = α + βBlackMayorc,t + f(MVc,t) + γBlackMayorc,t × f(MVc,t) + uc,t+1 (2.2)
where the dependent variable is police employment per 1,000 inhabitants in the
year following the election.
Table 2.5: Impact of a black mayor police employment per 1,000 inhabitants - RD estim-
ates
Tot police employment Police officers employed
(1) (2)
Black Mayor −1.044∗∗ −0.582∗
(0.51) (0.33)
N 105 105
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by
∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the election of a black mayor
on police total employment and police officers employed, using a flexible linear polynomial term in
the margin of victory. Controls include city, mayoral characteristics, year and state fixed effects. Std.
errors are clustered at city level.
In Table 2.5, the first column shows the impact of the election on an African-
American mayor in non-Southern cities on the number of total police employees per
1,000 inhabitants. The coefficient in column (1) is negative and statistically signi-
ficant, denoting a decrease in the number of police employees of 1.044 policemen
employed per 1,000 inhabitants. Unfortunately the data provided by the Histor-
ical Data Base on Individual Local Government Employment relative to the police
occupation does not distinguish the police officers according to their ranks; in this
respect, it might be difficult to pinpoint the specific mechanism through which mo-
tor vehicle theft is affected.16 However, the data do provide information on the
number of police sworn officers. For this reason, in order to gather further evidence
15 Data were not collected in 1996.
16 For example, I am not able to establish if the increase in motor vehicle theft might be explained
by a reduction in the number of police investigators.
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in favour of my results, I restrict the analysis on this category as they are, in fact,
“the only police employees who carry a gun and have the power to arrest” (Levitt,
1997). The coefficient presented in column (2) suggests that, on average, the elec-
tion of a black mayor in a close contest causes a decline of 5.82 police officers per
10,000 inhabitants; this effect is significant at the 10% level.
These results are in line with Hopkins and McCabe (2012); the authors, studying
how the first election of a black mayor can produce a significant impact on fiscal
and employment policies between 1986 and 2006, find that out of 28 indicators
analysed, the only ones significantly affected are the share of revenues devoted to
policing (negative), the share of city employees at the police department (negative),
and the share of black policemen employed (positive).17
The reduction of the number of police employees offers one of the possible channels
through which motor vehicle theft increases in the year following the election of a
black mayor. Past research studies into how a change in police employment affects
the incidence of crime gives strength to this result: Kelly (2000) finds a significant
negative correlation between police and property crime, while it remains negative
but not significant for violent crimes; Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) focus on the
terroristic attack against the Jewish centre “Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina”
occurred in 1984 in Buenos Aires. Although the data on the number of policemen
employed are not directly available, the authors exploit the government’s decision
to assign police protection to Jewish and Muslim buildings, finding that areas ex-
posed to increased police coverage are characterised by a reduction in the number
of car thefts. Levitt (1997) shows that an increase in the number of police in the US
leads to a decrease in violent crimes but not property crimes. Levitt (2002), after
re-estimating the model used in Levitt (1997) due to the presence of programming
and classification errors18, shows that the increase in police numbers is negatively
correlated to three particular types of crime only, i.e. murder, robbery and motor
17Differently from Vogl (2014), this study does not distinguish between the elections that oc-
curred in the Southern and the non-Southern States. The authors, however, report to tackle this
issue including possible omitted variables relative to the Southern cities (p. 689).
18 See McCrary (2002).
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vehicle theft.
2.7 Robustness
The results presented in Section 2.5 confirm that the number of motor vehicle thefts
per 1,000 inhabitants is the only crime category affected by the election of an African-
American mayor, regardless of the particular functional term adopted. In order to
check if this result is obtained by random chance, I run a series of tests aimed at
establishing the robustness of my findings.
2.7.1 Crime Rates - Increasing the Number of Data Points
Table 2.6: Impact of black mayor on motor vehicle theft - two years
m.v. theft m.v. theft m.v. theft
(1) (2) (3)
black mayor 4.855∗∗∗ 3.151∗∗∗ 2.001∗∗
(1.76) (1.02) (0.87)
N 260 254 254
Controls No Yes Yes
Year f.e. No Yes Yes
State f.e. No Yes No
City f.e. No No Yes
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at
the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to
the election of a black mayor on m.v. theft in the two years after the election, using a
flexible linear polynomial term in the margin of victory. Controls include city and mayoral
characteristics. Std. errors are clustered at city level.
As a first robustness check, I increase the data points by adding the number of
motor vehicles stolen per 1,000 inhabitants in the first two years after an interracial
mayoral election took place.19 In Table 2.6, Column (1) shows that the number of
motor vehicles stolen in the two years subsequent to the election increases by 4.855
per 1,000 inhabitants when a black mayor wins a multi-racial contest. The inclusion
of controls, year and state fixed effects in column (2) reduces the coefficient to 3.151
per 1,000 inhabitants; the coefficient, as in column (1), remains significant at the
19In order to avoid possible strategic behaviours of mayors seeking re-election, I do not include
the number of motor vehicle thefts that occurred three or four years after the election.
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1% level. Finally, replacing state fixed effects with city fixed effects, we observe a
decrease of the coefficient from 3.151 to 2.001 per 1,000 inhabitants. Compared to
the effect estimated in columns (1) and (2), the coefficient is now significant at the
5% level.20
2.7.2 Non-Parametric Estimator
The results presented so far are based on a parametric estimator, which is imple-
mented retaining all the elections in the sample where a black candidate competes
against a non-black candidate, and absorbing the variation coming from the observa-
tions far away from the threshold imposing an appropriate polynomial specification
of the running variable.

crimec,t+1 = α + βBlackMayorc,t + γMVc,t + δBlackMayorc,t ×MVc,t + uc,t+1
θ − h ≤MVc,t ≤ θ + h
Where θ is the cut-off point and h represents the bandwidth adopted.
(2.3)
In what follows, I exploit a non-parametric procedure in order to determine
whether my results are sensitive to the use of a different estimator.
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), I choose a rectangular kernel and estimate
a local linear regression within a reasonable small bandwidth h, since this amounts
to estimating a common regression over a window of width h on both sides of the
cut-off point, as presented in model (2.3). The optimal bandwidth is computed
using the method developed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), referred to from
now on as I-K.
In Table 2.7 I report the estimates of the coefficients and standard errors relative
to the election of an African-American mayor in a multi-racial race decided by a
20For the sake of completeness, I re-estimated model (2.1) linking the election of an African-
American mayor to the number of motor vehicles occurred two years after the mayoral contest.
The results, available upon request, are not statistically significant at any conventional level.
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Table 2.7: Impact of a black mayor on motor vehicle theft - RD non-parametric
estimates.
m.v. theft m.v. theft m.v. theft
(1) (2) (3)
Black Mayor 4.736∗∗ 5.981∗ 5.615∗∗∗
(2.06) (2.98) (2.01)
N 98 64 126
opt. band. I-K 0.472 0.236 0.944
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the
1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients, the std. errors and the number of
observations relative to the election of a black mayor on m.v. theft. Optimal bandwidths are
computed using the I-K method. Std. errors are clustered at city level.
narrow margin of victory, using the nonparametric method discussed above. As can
be seen, the I-K procedure computes a considerably large optimal bandwidth, i.e.
47.2%; this in turn might bias my estimates as we are considering observations that
are too far away from the threshold without imposing the correct functional form.
In the first column we can see that the election of a black mayor increases the
number of motor vehicle thefts by 4.736 per 1,000, using the I-K method; this effect
is statistically significant at the 5% level. In Columns (2) and (3), I re-estimate
model (2.3) halving and doubling the window of observations around the threshold
in order to check to what extent the results obtained are sensitive to the selection
of different bandwidths. In column (2), the lower number of observations used to
estimate the causal effect of the election of a black mayor on motor vehicle thefts
inflates the standard errors and decreases the statistical significance of the coefficient;
this is despite an increase in its size (5.981). On the other hand, when we double the
bandwidth the coefficient decreases slightly (coeff. 5.615) if compared to column (2)
while, due to the higher number of observations, we obtain a more precise estimate
that is now statistically significant at the 1% level.
2.7.3 Mayor’s Ethnicity vs Mayor’s Race
The results obtained so far showed that the election of a black mayor against a non-
black candidate determines a positive and significant effect on the number of motor
vehicles stolen per 1,000 inhabitants in the year following the electoral race. In this
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respect, however, it might be difficult to disentangle the ethnic minority status effect
from the racial effect related to the election of an African-American mayor.
Table 2.8: RD-estimates of the impact of an ethnic minority mayor on
motor vehicle thefts per 1,000 inhabitants.
m.v. theft m.v. theft
(1) (2)
ethnic minority mayor −0.349 2.521
(3.55) (4.00)
Controls No Yes
N 31 29
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗,
and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std.
errors relative to the election of an Asian-American or Hispanic/Latino candidate
competing against a white candidate on m.v. thefts per 1,000 inhabitants, using
a flexible linear polynomial term in the margin of victory. Controls include city
and mayoral characteristics. Std. errors are clustered at city level.
In order to shed light on this aspect, I estimate a model similar to equation (2.1),
where I exclude all the elections involving an African-American candidate; in this
way, I focus my analysis on the close elections where an Asian-American or His-
panic/Latino candidate runs against a white candidate.21 Therefore, the treatment
indicator now takes value 1 if the mayor elected belongs to one of the two ethnic
minority groups and 0 otherwise.
The estimates presented in Table 2.8 show that the number of motor vehicles stolen
caused by the election of an ethnic minority mayor against a white candidate is
close to 0 and not statistically significant; the inclusion of controls in column (2)22
increases the magnitude of the coefficients, passing from -0.349 to 2.521 per 1,000
inhabitants, while it remains statistically not significant at any conventional level.
This exercise corroborates the evidence in favour of the original findings since it
proves that it is the election of an African-American mayor in a close contest against
a non-black candidate rather than their ethnic minority status that exercises a pos-
itive impact on the number of motor vehicles stolen.
21In order to establish if the candidate is Hispanic/Latino, Asian-American or white, I consulted
several newspaper archives and elections bureaux.
22 Due to the reduced number of observations, I do not include year and state fixed effects.
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2.8 Conclusions
This study analyses how crime responds to the election of an African-American
mayor against a non-black candidate. Exploiting a parametric regression discon-
tinuity design, I am able to isolate the endogeneity of the election of a black mayor
at city level, by focusing on closely contested electoral races only. My main results
show that the election of a black mayor in a close multi-racial contest determines a
strong and positive impact on the number of motor vehicles stolen per 1,000 inhab-
itants the year after the interracial mayoral contest; this result is robust to a series
of tests as well as to the adoption of different polynomial specifications. In relation
to the other crime categories, I find a mild effect on the number of robberies and on
the sum of all the violent crime categories, which, however, tend to disappear when
different polynomial specifications are adopted. Passing to the property crimes, no
evidence of an influence of the race of the mayor is found on burglaries and larcenies,
or on the sum of all the property crimes categories.
The second part of this work provides an assessment of one of the possible channels
that might explain why motor vehicle theft is positively affected by the election of
a black mayor. Seminal research conducted in criminology and sociology in the late
1970s testified African-American mayors’ preferences for social welfare policies with
respect to protective services and physical facilities. In contrast, more recent works
have shown that a city where a black mayor is elected is not different from a city
where a non-black mayor is elected in terms of the fiscal and employment policies
adopted; the only exception here is police employment, as pointed out by Hopkins
and McCabe (2012).
In my study I find that the election of an African-American mayor has a negative
and statistically significant impact on the number of police employees. The econom-
ics of crime literature provides a satisfactory rationalisation of this phenomenon: a
reduction in police employment, by lowering the opportunity cost of committing
crime, helps explain why the number of motor vehicles stolen increases considerably
after the election of a black mayor.
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Chapter 3
They win, I leave: the impact of
the Northern League party on
foreign internal migration
3.1 Introduction
On 1 March 2016, soon after the crushing victory in seven states obtained in the
first Super Tuesday by Donald Trump against his Republican rivals, the number
of Google searches in the US for advice on how to leave the country and move
to neighbouring Canada skyrocketed (Appendix B, Figure B.1). Quite curiously,
a few months later, immediately after the referendum results on Brexit that took
place on 23 June, Google trends data showed a spike in interest among Britons on
how to leave the UK, moving to other countries such as Northern Ireland or France
(Appendix B, Figure B.2).
These simple anecdotes pose an important question that this paper seeks to ad-
dress: do electoral outcomes affect migration decisions, leading people to relocate to
a different place when an electoral result or a politician dividing the public consensus
obtains an unexpected victory?
A growing body of research conducted in psychology has tried to indirectly ana-
lyse this issue, studying how non-economic push or pull factors affect migration
decisions. Rosenbaum (1986) develops the repulsion hypothesis, according to which
the sentiment of repulsion by the dominance of dissimilar individuals exacerbates
people’s intention to migrate. Motyl (2014) and Motyl et al. (2014) theorise the
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ideological migration hypothesis, arguing that:
“People with certain racial identities, personalities and ideologies may
feel like their needs are not being met in one residence, so they could
choose to change residences to better satisfy these needs.” (p. 1)
To shed light on how elections can affect migration decisions, I use a data set
relative to the mayoral elections in Italy to study how foreign internal migration
responds to the election of a candidate affiliated to the Northern League (Lega
Nord) party, a far-right political movement known for its racist and xenophobic
attitudes and characterised by a strong federalist, populist and anti-immigration
ideology.
Contrary to the seminal works by Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957), according
to which the type of policies implemented by politicians merely reflect the prefer-
ences of the median voter, a recent array of studies has largely shown that politicians’
preferences play a crucial role in determining the set of economic and political meas-
ures adopted (Besley and Coate (1997); Levitt (1996)). In the context of this paper,
if politicians’ preferences differ by partisanship, the adoption by a Northern League
(NL from hereafter) mayor of specific policies or behaviours that favour Italian cit-
izens over foreign citizens might push foreigners to relocate to a city with an officer
affiliated to a different political party or a civic list in charge.
In order to overcome possible sources of endogeneity related to the election of
an NL mayor, the identification strategy relies on a sharp regression discontinuity
design (RDD). I analyse the mayoral elections in Italian cities between 2001 and
2014, exploiting the races decided by a narrow margin of victory, where the mayor
or the runner-up are affiliated to the Northern League party.
To precisely estimate the effect of the Northern League on migration, I exclude
the elections in which an NL candidate was supported by a coalition of two or more
parties or civic lists.
My main findings confirm that the election of a Northern League mayor causes an
increase in the foreign out-migration rate in the year following the electoral race. On
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the other hand, foreign in-migration and net migration do not seem to be influenced.
To shed light on the possible factors driving these results, I show that, in cities
ruled by an NL mayor, there is a reduction in the number of Italian citizenship
acquisitions. This signals a perception by resident foreigners of an increased barrier
to acquiring citizenship, a likely cause for foreign citizens to migrate. In order to
provide further evidence in favour of this hypothesis, I show that Italian citizens do
not migrate in response to the election of a Northern League mayor.
This paper is related to the strand of research studying how the partisanship
of newly elected politicians influences different economic, political and social out-
comes. Lee (2008), exploiting data relative to the elections to the US House of
Representative (1946-1998), shows that an incumbent Democrat is more likely to
win the subsequent elections. Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) argues that Swedish left-
wing governments increase public spending and taxation if compared to right-wing
parties. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) find that in American large cities no significant
relationship exists between the party of a newly elected mayor and the size of city
government, the allocation of public spending and crime rates. Meyersson (2014)
demonstrates that Turkish cities exposed to an Islamic party are characterised by
a higher female secular high school education. Beland (2015) finds lower average
individual earnings in the United States when a Democratic governor is elected.
Galindo-Silva (2015) argues that the election of politicians affiliated to newly formed
parties in Colombian municipalities affects the size of the government. Basile and
Filoso (2016) show that there is no difference between the outcomes of the policies
ratified by left and right-wing parties in Italy. Beland and Oloomi (2017) show that
Democratic governors assign a larger share of their budget to health and education
spending.
In this paper, it is my intention to establish a causal nexus between the election
of a politician and foreign migration. The economic literature has mostly focused on
the opposite direction of causality, addressing how electoral or political outcomes are
influenced by migration: Pfutze (2012) finds that international migration in Mexico
46
improves the quality of local democratic institutions in Mexico. Chauvet and Mercier
(2014) find that returning migrants in Mali have a positive effect on participation and
electoral competitiveness. Otto and Steinhardt (2014) and Barone et al. (2016) show
that immigration causes an increase in votes for xenophobic and anti-immigrant
coalitions in Germany and Italy, respectively. Dustmann et al. (2016) estimate
the causal effect of refugee migration on voting outcomes in parliamentary and
municipal elections in Denmark, finding a positive effect on anti-immigration and
centre-right parties in non-urban places; on the other hand, a negative effect is
detected if the elections take place in urban municipalities. Becker and Fetzer (2016)
focus their analysis on the UK, showing that in places with a large number of
migrants from Eastern Europe there was an increase in the vote shares for the UK
Independence Party (UKIP) in elections to the European Parliament, used as an
indicator for anti-European sentiment after 2004. Halla et al. (2017) show that the
inflow of immigrants in Austria increases voting for far-right parties. Mayda et al.
(2016) argue that immigration to the US has a negative impact on the votes to the
Republican party.
To the best of my knowledge, this represents the first study addressing a causal
relationship between the election of a mayor affiliated to a party standing for its
racist positions1 and foreign internal migration.2
The article is organised as follows: Section 3.2 presents the institutional set-
ting; Section 3.3 describes the data used and provides some descriptive statistics;
Section 3.4 explains the methodology and the econometric model adopted; Section
1A sentence passed by a judge in Italy on 13 January 2017 established that defining the Northern
League party as racist is not a defamatory statement but a political criticism (Il Fatto Quotidiano,
2017).
2At the time of writing up this paper, a new working paper exploring how immigrants’ location
choices in Italy are affected by a mayor affiliated or supported by a Lega Nord candidate was issued
(Bracco et al., 2017) My work crucially differs from Bracco et al. (2017) in the more rigorous way
in which I define the treatment indicator. I focus on a narrower set of elections, with only NL
candidates running for the mayoral office, and exclude polls with candidates affiliated to other
parties for which the Northern League party only provided external support. I believe that the
focus of this paper necessitates an indicator of political preferences as clean and as unambiguous
as possible, for which I assume it is appropriate to consider only mayoral offices where Lega Nord
could fully exert its political influence. The difference in the treatment indicator and the sample
of analysis determines completely different results compared to Bracco et al. (2017).
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3.5 presents the main results; in Section 3.6, I show the impact of an NL mayor
on the neighbouring cities and on foreign international migration. In Section 3.7, I
discuss how Northern League mayors might reduce the perception of integration to-
wards non-Italian residents, while in Section 3.8, I perform some robustness checks.
Section 3.9, finally, concludes the paper.
3.2 Institutional Setting
3.2.1 Electoral Law for Italian Municipalities
Approximately 91% of the municipalities in Italy has less than 15,000 inhabitants.3
City and towns are governed by mayors, who manage and coordinate important
services at the municipal level, such as infrastructures, public utilities, municipal
police, environmental services, transports, welfare and housing. Mayors are elected
every five years by the inhabitants of the municipalities, but they cannot be re-
elected after two terms.4
As discussed by Bordignon et al. (2016), the electoral law for Italian municipal-
ities passed in 19935 poses different rules for the election of the mayor, differentiated
by the size of cities or towns. For municipalities below 15,000 inhabitants, the mayor
is elected with a single ballot system. Parties or coalitions propose their preferred
candidate for mayor and the list of candidates for the city council. The mayoral
candidate with more votes becomes mayor whilst her party or list is awarded with
2/3 of the seats in the council. The remaining 1/3 is divided among the losing lists
proportionally to their share of votes.
For municipalities above 15,000 inhabitants, the elections for the mayoral office
are structured according to a dual ballot scheme, in which parties or coalitions
decide the mayoral candidate to support and present lists of candidates for the
council. Each candidate can be supported by more than one list. The candidate
3In April 2017, the total number of municipalities amounted to 7,982.
4Mayors are allowed to run for a third non-consecutive mandate. This principle of contiguity
is not required for small towns (below 3000 inhabitants).
5 Law 81/1993.
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becomes the new mayor if she gets more than 50% of the votes in the first round.6
Otherwise, the two best contenders compete in a second round where who gets more
votes becomes mayor.
3.2.2 The Northern League Party
The Northern League party (Lega Nord) was established in 1991 by Umberto Bossi
as a partnership of pre-existing regional parties of northern and central Italy.7 The
party’s political agenda promotes the conversion of Italy into a federal state and
the secession of the North, allowing the Northern regions, called by party members
Padania, to keep more tax revenues collected under a regime of fiscal federalism.
The Northern League party endorses a socially conservative position on issues
such as abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage. On the contrary, it adopts a
strong position against crime (for which the party has advocated the promotion of
citizens’ defence groups), and illegal immigration, especially from Muslim countries.
Officially the NL party favours immigration from non-Muslim countries to protect
the “Christian identity” of Italy and Europe; de facto it nurtures a solid resentment
against non-Muslim populations too, especially against Central-Eastern European
immigrants.8 In 2002 the Northern League, together with other Italian parties, was
denounced by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)
for the extreme use of racist and xenophobic propaganda.9 In 2006, ECRI reported
an intensification of the use of racist and xenophobic political talks, both at the
local and at the national level.
Since 2012, the party has undergone a restructuring of its political leadership with
the election of Roberto Maroni as the new secretary of the party; from December
2013, Maroni was succeeded by the new Northern League head, Matteo Salvini.
6Voters express two preferences, one for a mayoral candidate and one for a party list. The two
votes may be disjoint.
7The most important ones are Lega Lombarda, Liga Veneta, Piemonte Autonomista, Unione
Ligure, Lega Emiliano-Romagnola, and Alleanza Toscana.
8For example, in 2007 the Northern League was strongly against the inclusion of Romania and
Bulgaria into the Schengen area.
9See, for example, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2002).
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Despite changes to the leadership that occurred in recent years, the episodes of
racisms did not stop: for example, in 2013 the first Italian black minister, Ce´cile
Kyenge, was compared to an orangutan by a Northern-League Senator (Kington,
2013), causing considerable public indignation.
3.2.3 Foreign Population in Italy
Data collected by the Italian National Institute of Statistics in the last 15 years
document a steady increase in the foreign population legally residing in Italy. In
2002, foreign residents represented the 2.7% of the total population; 13 years later, in
2015, the share of foreign residents increased to 8.3%, in part due to the enlargement
of the European Union on 1 January 2007, with the inclusion of Romania and
Bulgaria.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of foreign population in Italy - 2012
Concerning the spatial distribution of foreign citizens in Italy, immigration has
affected the Italian regions differently. As documented by Bettin and Cela (2014)
“the Southern regions represent for many migrants the gateway to Italy and the first
step towards the Northern and Central regions” (p. 54). Southern Italy is character-
ised mostly by illegal migration, while legal migrants cluster in the Northern cities,
where there is a higher labour demand and better services. The data collected by
the Italian National Institute of Statistics relative to the year 2012 (see Figure 3.1)
indicate that 86% of foreign citizens are concentrated in the North (62%) and in the
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Centre (24%), with only the remaining 14% living in the South (10%) and in the
Islands (4%).
3.3 Data
The surveys “Migration and calculation of foreign resident population and structure
by citizenship” and “Migration and calculation of yearly resident population”, collec-
ted by the Italian National Institute of Statistics, provide since 200110 information
on a yearly basis on foreign and total migration at the municipal level respectively.
The survey “Migration and calculation of foreign resident population and struc-
ture by citizenship” defines the foreign resident population as individuals without
Italian citizenship who register in the Italian city where they normally reside. It is
calculated for each municipality on 31 December of each year, adjusting the foreign
population in each municipality with the foreign population inflows and outflows re-
corded during each calendar year. The registration represents the first prerequisite
for foreign citizens to obtain Italian citizenship, and gives access to a set of public
services, such as schools, public health provision and social benefits. For each mu-
nicipality, the data allow the identification of the non-Italian people having their
usual residence in a specific city, the number of Italian citizenships acquisitions, the
number of foreign migrants moving to a municipality from abroad or from other
Italian cities, as well as the number of foreign residents living in Italy who relocate
abroad or to a different city.11
The survey “Migration and calculation of yearly resident population” provides
information relative to the total population and the Italian population, on the num-
ber of live births, deaths, internal and international migration flows for each Italian
municipality, and the number of resident inhabitants at the end of the year.
Italian and foreign residents relocating to a different city are required to act-
10In my analysis, I exclude the year 2001, since the data refer to the period October-December
only.
11Unfortunately, the data do not allow to identify internal and international in/out migrants by
their nationality.
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ively register in the municipality of destination. Since 2012 the (de)registration
procedures take place with immediate effect. Prior to 2012, the record of internal
migratory movements took place in two steps: 1) the new municipality of residence
was required to communicate the change of residence to the city of origin; 2) in
turn, the municipality of origin proceeded with the cancellation of the migrant from
the population register. The Italian National Institute of Statistics did not report
any issues on the presence of lags or delays in the (de)registration process. For
citizens moving or living abroad the (de)registration procedure has never required
the aforementioned two step process.12
The Historical Election Archive, made available by the Italian Ministry of In-
terior, provides results relative to the Popular and Constitutional Referenda (from
1946), the European Parliament elections (from 1979), and the general (from 1948),
regional (from 1970), provincial (from 2004) and municipal elections13 (from 1993)
that occurred in Italy up to 2014.
I complement this dataset with the Census of Local and Regional Administrat-
ors, containing information on observable characteristics, such as party affiliation,
education, age and gender of the elected mayor, the losing mayoral candidates, the
members of the council and the executive committee. Given the local dimension of
the Northern League party, I excluded all the municipalities from the Central and
Southern regions, focusing on the cities and towns belonging to Piedmont, Lom-
bardy, Liguria, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna (See Appendix B, Figure B.3).
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics relative to the NL elections. Overall,
398 out of 9,886 elections involved the participation of an NL mayor or runner-up
in 294 cities. I exclude those elections where an NL candidate participated in an
electoral contest in a coalition of two or more parties or civic lists. In 339 electoral
12A possible concern could be the existence of underreporting, which could bias the standard
errors if Italian and foreign citizens forgot to change the residence from the city of origin to the city
of destination. However, I believe this does not represent a strong problem, since it is in someone’s
best interest to register in the new city, in order to benefit from different services, such as housing
or welfare.
13The data are not provided for the mayoral elections relative to three Northern regions, i.e.
Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli-Venezia Giulia.
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races, a Northern League candidate ran against a contender affiliated to independent
local organisations, i.e. civic lists, while in the remaining mayoral designations
an NL politician was confronting either a centre-right candidate (28 times) or a
centre-left candidate (16 times). Finally, in 15 cases, a candidate confronting an NL
politician was running independently or in affiliation to a newly created party. On
190 occasions, an NL candidate won an electoral contest, denoting a higher number
of NL runners-up in the election sample.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics -
Election Data
# Elections 9886
# NL elections 398
# NL vs Civic List 339
# NL vs Centre-Right 28
# NL vs Centre-Left 16
# NL vs Other 15
# NL Mayors 190
# Cities - NL election sample 294
Average NL Elections/city 1.33
Source: Author’s calculations based
on data from the Historical Election
Archive and the Census of Local and
Regional Administrators.
To assess the external validity of this study, in Table 3.2 I compare the municipal
and mayoral characteristics of the elections involving the participation of a Northern
League candidate14 as a mayor or runner-up (referred to as the NL sample) against
the remaining elections (referred to as the Non-NL sample).
The list of city observable characteristics includes the number of inhabitants,
the number of Italian and foreign citizens living in a city, geographic indicators such
as altitude expressed in meters and the area of a municipality expressed in km2,
the number of firms in each municipality in 2012, and the yearly average municipal
income per capita expressed in 2010 euros. Among the mayoral characteristics, I
include age, gender, education and the incumbency status of the mayor.
14As previously anticipated, I am excluding from this category the elections involving the parti-
cipation of an NL candidate in a coalition with two or more parties or a civic list.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics - Municipal and Mayoral Character-
istics
NL Sample Non-NL Sample p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Tot Pop. 5949.49 6702.74 [0.631]
Foreign Pop. 436.98 528.52 [0.577]
Italian Pop. 5512.51 6174.22 [0.640]
Income pc in 2010e 19514.93 20114.5 [0.007]
Firms in 2012 663.91 994.04 [0.431]
Area (km2) 17.19 25.60 [0.000]
Altitude 240.29 291.13 [0.000]
Mayor gender (male =1) 0.879 0.847 [0.077]
Mayor age 48.52 50.03 [0.005]
Mayor education 0.306 0.363 [0.020]
Mayor incumbent 0.236 0.226 [0.655]
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the ISTAT, the Historical
Election Archive and the Census of Local and Regional Administrators.
Note. Each entry represents the average of the specified variable. Column
(1) presents the average for the NL election sample. Column (2) reports
descriptive statistics for the remaining elections. Column (3) reports the p-
values relative to the test for equality of means in the two samples.
On average, NL elections take place in slightly smaller cities (however, the differ-
ence is not statistically significant at any conventional level); the number of foreign
citizens and the total population are not statistically different when I compare the
elections involving a Northern League candidate against the remaining contests.
NL elections occur in cities with a lower income per capita, whereas no difference is
registered on the number of firms in 2012 per municipality.
With reference to the mayoral characteristics, in the NL election sample mayors
are more likely to be male, younger and less educated15 if compared to the remaining
15The education variable takes value 1 if the mayor has a university degree, and 0 otherwise.
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sample.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The election of a mayor affiliated to the Northern League party is likely to be de-
termined by municipal local attributes that are unobserved by the econometrician,
and this will bias the estimates on migration outcomes. To deal with this source
of endogeneity, I convey my analysis on close elections, comparing cities where NL
candidates barely won an election with cities where NL contenders barely lost: for
elections decided by a narrow margin, which aspirant will win is likely to be determ-
ined by pure chance.
The identification strategy is based on a nonparametric sharp regression dis-
continuity design (RDD)16, which implements a local linear regression within the
optimal bandwidth determined by the method developed by Calonico et al. (2014)
- CCT from hereafter.17
In order to evaluate how the election of a mayor affiliated to the Northern League
party can affect migration, I restrict the sample to municipalities in the interval
MVm,t ∈ [−h,+h] and estimate the following model:
migrationm,t+1 = β0 + β1NLm,t + β2MVm,t + um,t+1 (3.1)
where the dependent variable migrationm,t+1 represents three possible outcomes:
the number of foreign in-migrants per 1,000 inhabitants, the number of foreign
out-migrants per 1,000 inhabitants, and the foreign net migration rate, defined as
the difference between the first two variables, expressed per 1,000 inhabitants for
municipality m in the year following the mayoral election. NLm,t, the treatment
indicator, is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the candidate affiliated to the
16See Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Van Der Klaauw (2008), or Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a
comprehensive survey on RDD.
17Contrary to the pre-existing nonparametric estimators, which compute relatively wide band-
widths, Calonico et al. (2014) determine the optimal bandwidth constructing confidence intervals
that are robust to large bandwidths.
55
Northern League party wins the election and 0 otherwise; the running variable,
MVm,t, is the margin of victory, defined as the difference between the first two
candidates’ votes divided by the sum of votes of all the candidates participating in
the mayoral elections in which a Northern League candidate ranked first or second.
In the most rigorous specification, I augment model (1) by controlling for city
and mayoral characteristics as well as year and region fixed effects.
To precisely estimate the effect of the Northern League partisanship, I exclude
all the elections where an NL candidate took part in a coalition with two or more
parties or civic lists. If on the one hand this reduces my sample size considerably,
on the other I am able to isolate the “Northern League effect” from the role that
other parties could play on foreigners’ decision to migrate.18
Provided that 1) the running variable is measured prior to the start of treatment,
2) the cut-off point is determined independently of the running variable, and 3)
assignment to treatment is entirely based on the candidate votes and the cut-off
point, for the identification strategy to be internally valid, I need to test whether
the probability of winning a close election is the same for all candidates, regardless
of their partisanship.
Following McCrary (2008), I estimate possible discontinuities in the distribution
of the running variable, as the presence of a statistically significant discontinuity in
the margin of victory around the cut-off would suggest that the running variable has
been subject to manipulation. Figure B.4, in Appendix B, presents the distribution
of the margin of victory of a Northern League candidate against a mayor or runner-
up associated to a different party, civic list or coalition. The null hypothesis of
no discontinuity is not rejected (the estimated log difference is equal to -0.201 and
the standard error is equal to 0.23), allowing the conclusion that the election of a
mayor affiliated to the Northern League decided by a narrow margin of victory can
be considered as good as random.
18For example, the presence of moderate or centre-wing parties in a coalition with the Northern
League could mitigate foreign citizens’ decisions to emigrate if they trust the other parties’ ability
to keep Northern League’s racist pressure under control.
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Table 3.3: Internal validity test - Discontinuity in
the covariates
β N h
(se)
Tot Pop. −1235.8 157 0.140
(1526.8)
Foreign Pop. 191.4 175 0.164
(165.62)
Italian Pop. −1444.7 155 0.138
(1422.60)
ln(Income pc in 2010e) 0.053 171 0.160
(0.06)
ln(Firms in 2012) −0.421 152 0.136
(0.35)
Area (km2) −0.426 191 0.185
(5.07)
Altitude 50.519 226 0.221
(56.09)
Mayor gender (male =1) −0.208 167 0.152
(0.151)
Mayor age −4.805 178 0.168
(3.19)
Mayor education −0.106 215 0.211
(0.16)
Mayor incumbent 0.054 178 0.170
(0.07)
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the
ISTAT and the Historical Election Archive.
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by
*, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. er-
rors relative to the election of an NL mayor using the
method developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Standard
errors are clustered at the municipal level.
As a second and final test, I check whether the baseline covariates vary smoothly
at the cut-off since a violation of this condition would discard the internal validity
of my RDD exercise. Figure B.5, in Appendix B, offers a preliminary visual in-
spection of how mayoral and city characteristics differ between the group of cities
ruled by an NL mayor and the remaining municipalities. Concerning the municipal
characteristics, I observe a jump in the number of foreign residents (panel (b)) and
in the yearly average income per capita expressed in log base (panel (d)) when an
NL mayor is elected; the remaining observables do not present any discontinuity in
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correspondence of the cut-off. Passing to the mayoral covariates, the variables of
interest present a downward jump in the Italian municipalities governed by North-
ern League mayors. Unlike the other mayoral characteristics, the incumbency status
(panel (k)) is not discontinuous in correspondence of the cut-off.
Table 3.3 reports the RD estimates of model (1) using the municipal and mayoral
characteristics as dependent variables in order to establish if the discontinuities
observed in Figure B.5 are statistically significant. The cities where a Northern
League mayor won a close election do not seem to be systematically different from
those cities where an NL candidate barely lost the race for the mayoral office. Since
the estimates obtained could be sensitive to the choice of the specific bandwidth
computed by CCT, in Appendix B I check if the results presented in Table 3.3
change when a different window of observations is adopted. Halving (Table B.1)
or doubling the bandwidth (Table B.2) leaves my main conclusions unchanged, i.e.
municipal and mayoral characteristics are not discontinuous around the cut-off.
3.5 Effect on Foreign Internal Migration
Figure 3.2 offers a graphical assessment of the impact of Northern League mayors
on migration, where different measures of foreign migration are plotted against the
running variable, i.e. the margin of victory of a candidate affiliated to the NL party
who ranked first or second in a mayoral contest competing against a politician of a
different party or civic list.
In panel (a) I observe a mild jump, indicating an increase in the number of foreign
in-migrants per 1,000 inhabitants in response to the election of a mayor affiliated
to the Northern League party. The discontinuity seems to be stronger when I look
at the foreign out-migration rate (centre-panel), while in panel (c) I do not find a
strong effect on the foreign net migration rate, defined as the difference between the
in-migration and the out-migration rate.
In order to establish whether these discontinuities are statistically significant,
Table 3.4 presents the estimates relative to the election of a candidate running for
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(a) Foreign in-migration (b) Foreign out-migration (c) Foreign net-migration
Figure 3.2: The impact of an NL mayor on foreign migration
mayoral office with the Northern League party on the three measures of migration
presented above, occurring one year after the electoral race. Two important points
are worth stressing: first, the CCT method computes different optimal bandwidths
for different dependent variables. This, in turn, determines a strong variation in the
sample size, making the results hardly comparable. In order to overcome this prob-
lem, throughout the paper I adopt a unique optimal bandwidth (0.135), computed
by the CCT method for the set of regressions adopting the foreign out-migration
rate as dependent variable.19 Second, the choice of non-contemporaneity between
the election and the year of migration is motivated by the fact that the majority of
municipal elections in Italy take place in May/June. Linking the impact of a North-
ern League mayor to the same year’s foreign migratory movements would introduce
a measurement error, since I would link the victory or the loss of an NL candidate
to the migration flows that occurred prior to the electoral race.
The RD estimate in column (1) shows that the impact of the election of a mayor
affiliated to the Northern League party on the foreign in-migration rate is positive
but not statistically significant at any conventional level. The inclusion of controls
at the municipal and mayoral level, as well as year and region fixed effects, decreases
the size of the coefficient; however, it remains statistically not significant (column
2). Unlike the previous case, the coefficient relative to the foreign out-migration
rate is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The result in column
19For the sake of completeness, I have re-estimated all the models without imposing a unique
bandwidth. The results, available upon request, confirm all the findings discussed in this paper.
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(3) shows that one year after the close election of a Northern League mayor, 3.2
foreign citizens per 1,000 inhabitants migrate to a different city. The effect is quite
substantial, since its size represents 51% of the yearly average of the number of
foreign out-migrants per 1,000 inhabitants. The addition of controls decreases the
coefficient to 2.363, which is now statistically significant at the 5% level. Finally,
in columns (5) and (6) I look at the foreign net migration rate. Regardless of the
specification adopted, the impact of a mayor affiliated to the Northern League party
has no effect on the difference between the in-migration rate and the out-migration
rate.
Table 3.4: RD estimates - The impact of NL mayors on foreign
internal migration - unique bandwidth
in-migration out-migration net-migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NL Mayor 1.082 0.523 3.247∗∗∗ 2.363∗∗ −2.165 −1.839
(2.780) (2.085) (1.213) (0.972) (2.484) (1.979)
N 153 151 153 151 153 151
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
mean dep var. 6.530 6.359 0.170
h 0.135 0.135 0.135
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Each entry reports the RD coefficients
and std. errors relative to the election of an NL mayor using the method
developed by Calonico et al. (2014), using a bandwidth equal to 0.135.
Controls include city (foreign population, Italian population, area, alti-
tude, (log) number of firms and (log) average income per capita expressed
in 2010e), mayoral characteristics (gender, education, incumbency status
and age), year and region fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipal level.
The results presented in Table 3.4 might be determined by the specific bandwidth
computed by the CCT method, viz. 0.135. In order to dissipate this concern, I test
whether the selection of different bandwidths causes a drastic change in the effects
discussed above.
Table 3.5 - Panel A - presents the results obtained halving the optimal bandwidth
estimated by the CCT estimator. The smaller window of observations (0.0675)
produces more imprecise estimates, due to the reduced sample size. Nonetheless,
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the results confirm the main findings displayed in Table 3.4. In particular, from
column (3) it is possible to notice that the size of effect on the foreign out-migration
rate is stronger (5.181) whilst it remains statistically significant at the 1% level.
The inclusions of controls reduces the coefficient to 3.277, now significant at the
10% level. The impact on the remaining two indicators is not statically significant.
Passing to Panel B - the adoption of a large bandwidth (0.270) does not affect the
impact on foreign out-migration (column 3 and 4): regardless of the specification
used, the effect is statistically significant at the 1% and the 5% level and only
marginally different from the corresponding coefficients displayed in Table 3.4. Also
in this case, no effect is detected on foreign in-migration (columns 1 and 2) and
net-migration (columns 5 and 6).
Table 3.5: RD estimates - The impact of NL mayors on foreign
internal migration - unique bandwidth
in-migration out-migration net-migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
NL Mayor 1.883 2.582 5.180∗∗∗ 3.277∗ −3.297 −0.695
(3.717) (3.790) (1.441) (1.869) (3.443) (3.622)
N 84 82 84 82 84 82
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
h 0.0675 0.0675 0.0675
Panel B
NL Mayor 1.168 0.005 3.396∗∗∗ 2.138∗∗ −2.228 −2.132
(2.629) (2.125) (1.166) (0.996) (2.379) (2.088)
N 266 263 266 263 266 263
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
h 0.270 0.270 0.270
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Each entry reports the
RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the election of an NL
mayor using the method developed by Calonico et al. (2014), using a
bandwidth equal to 0.0675 (Panel A) and to 0.270 (Panel B). Controls
include city (foreign population, Italian population, area, altitude,
(log) number of firms and (log) average income per capita expressed
in 2010e), mayoral characteristics (gender, education, incumbency
status and age), year and region fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level.
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3.6 Further Analysis on Foreign Migration
3.6.1 Effect on Neighbouring Cities
The data on migration collected by the Italian National Institute of Statistics do
not allow the identification of the city of origin or the city of destination of foreign
and Italian migrants. Nonetheless, in this section I re-estimate model (3.1) focusing
on the number of foreign in-migrants per 1,000 inhabitants in the cities that border
a municipality where an NL mayor was elected one year before.20
Table 3.6: RD estimates - The impact of NL mayors on
foreign internal immigration - Neighbouring cities
in-migration
(1) (2)
NL Mayor −0.712 −0.215
(0.741) (0.606)
N 953 914
Controls No Yes
h 0.135 0.135
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the
5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Each entry reports
the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the election of
an NL mayor using the method developed by Calonico et al.
(2014), using a bandwidth equal to 0.135. Controls include city
(foreign population, Italian population, area, altitude, (log)
number of firms and (log) average income per capita expressed
in 2010e), mayoral characteristics (gender, education, incum-
bency status and age), year and region fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipal level.
From Table 3.6 it is possible to see that cities neighbouring a municipality where
an NL mayor was elected one year before do not attract more foreign citizens. In
column (1) the coefficient is negative, denoting a decrease in the number of foreign in-
migrants per 1,000 inhabitants, and not statistically significant at any conventional
level. In column (2) the inclusion of controls, year and region fixed effects, reduces
the coefficient’s size in absolute value; also in this case, the effect is not statistically
significant.
20I excluded those cities in which the mayor in charge was affiliated to the Northern League
party.
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These results indicate that the election of a mayor affiliated to the Northern
League party does not lead foreign citizens to migrate to neighbouring cities.
3.6.2 Effect on Foreign International Migration
To get a better understanding of how foreign citizens shape their migration decisions
in response to the election of a Northern League candidate, I re-estimate model (3.1)
by looking at the impact of an NL mayor on foreign international migration. Table
3.7 presents the results.
The election of an NL politician does not have any effect on foreign international
in-migration in the year after the electoral contest. Passing to the out-migration
indicators, columns (3) and (4) confirm that foreign citizens do not relocate abroad
when an NL mayor is elected. Likewise, the results presented in the last two columns
corroborate the absence of any statistically significant effect on the foreign interna-
tional net migration rate.
Table 3.7: RD estimates - The impact of NL mayors on foreign
international migration
in-migration out-migration net-migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NL Mayor 2.093 0.787 0.391 0.002 1.702 0.785
(1.703) (1.055) (0.371) (0.286) (1.545) (0.978)
N 153 151 153 151 153 151
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
mean dep var. 6.569 0.829 5.739
h 0.135 0.135 0.135
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Each entry reports the RD coeffi-
cients and std. errors relative to the election of an NL mayor using the
method developed by Calonico et al. (2014), using a bandwidth equal
to 0.135. Controls include city (foreign population, Italian population,
area, altitude, (log) number of firms and (log) average income per cap-
ita expressed in 2010e), mayoral characteristics (gender, education,
incumbency status and age), year and region fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipal level.
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3.7 Discussion
The results analysed so far confirm the existence of a strong and statistically sig-
nificant impact on the number of foreign citizens moving to different municipalities
in response to the election of an NL mayor decided by a narrow margin of victory.
There may be several motivations explaining why a Northern League mayor causes
an increase in foreign emigration; in this chapter I adduce reinforcing evidence in
favour of the idea according to which NL mayors decrease the perception of social in-
clusion towards non-Italian citizens. In section 3.7.1 I look at the number of Italian
citizenships acquired by foreign residents, whilst in section 3.7.2 I study how the
Italian internal migratory flows respond to the election of an NL mayor.
3.7.1 Italian Citizenship Acquisitions
Foreign residents awarded with Italian citizenship are required to swear allegiance to
the Constitution and laws of the Republic in front of the mayor of the municipality
where the foreign applicant legally resides. Despite its purely symbolic function, if
the oath of allegiance does not take place within six months of notification of the
award decree, it will lose its validity, requiring foreign applicants to reproduce the
whole documentation and start a new application process.
According to the Law of 5 February 1992 n. 91, and the implementing regulation
(Decree of the President Republic 12 October 1993 n. 572), Italian citizenship can be
attributed for different reasons: automatically (principle of jus sanguinis), through
marriage (after two years of legal residence in Italy, or three years abroad21) or
through naturalisation (if a foreign born person has been legally resident in Italy
for at least ten years22, provided that they do not have a criminal record and have
sufficient financial resources).
Notwithstanding the absence of any test on the Italian language or culture, as
21For children, the time requirement will be halved; Italian citizenship acquisition is granted
automatically to foreign women if they married an Italian citizen before 27 April 1983.
22This requirement is reduced to three years for descendants of Italian citizen grandparents and
for foreigners born in Italy, four years for nationals of EU member states, five years for refugees
and seven years for those adopted as children by an Italian citizen.
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required in countries such as the US or the UK, several mayors affiliated to the
Northern League party in the past hit the headlines for having refused to confer
citizenship to foreign born applicants who were not able to swear the oath of allegi-
ance in Italian23, leading the Minister of the Interior Angelino Alfano to claim the
unconstitutionality of these actions during his Question Time on 10 February 2016
(Ministero dell’Interno, 2016).
In order to give strength to such anecdotal evidence, I re-estimate model (3.1)
adopting the number of Italian citizenships acquisitions per 1,000 foreign residents
granted one year after the close election of a Northern League mayor as a new
dependent variable. Importantly, I add foreign in-migration and out-migration to
the set of controls, to make sure these results are not driven by foreign migratory
flows.
Table 3.8: RD estimates - The impact of NL mayors on
the rate of Italian citizenship acquisitions
Italian Citizenship Rate
(1)
NL Mayor −12.435∗∗
(5.619)
N 151
Controls Yes
mean dependent variable 17.859
h 0.135
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the
5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Each entry re-
ports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the elec-
tion of an NL mayor using the method developed by Calonico
et al. (2014), using a bandwidth equal to 0.135. Controls in-
clude city (total population, Italian population, area, altitude,
(log) number of firms and (log) average income per capita ex-
pressed in 2010e, foreign internal in-migration, foreign internal
out-migration, foreign international in-migration and foreign in-
ternational out-migration), mayoral characteristics (gender, edu-
cation, incumbency status and age), year and region fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.
As we can see from Table 3.8, the coefficient is negative and statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% level; the close election of a Northern League mayor decreases
23See for example the article reported by FirstPost (2015).
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the number of Italian citizenship acquisitions by 12.43 per 1,000 foreign inhabit-
ants, one year after the electoral competition. Unfortunately, the data do not allow
the establishment of how many applications were denied; likewise, I cannot exclude
that a reduction in citizenship acquisitions could be driven by a decrease in foreign
citizens’ demand for Italian nationality status.
Nonetheless, this simple exercise corroborates the idea of a decreased perception
of social inclusion towards foreign citizens, which could represent one of the possible
reasons pushing foreign residents to move to a different city in response to the
election of a mayor affiliated to the Northern League party.
3.7.2 Falsification Test - Italian Citizens Internal Migration
In this section, as a falsification test, I explore whether Italian citizens’ migration
can be influenced by the election of a far-right political party. If the Italian residents’
decision to migrate was affected by the election of a Northern League candidate I
should conclude that features other than the strong anti-immigration, racist and
xenophobic stance adopted by the Northern League party are playing a role in
determining foreign citizens’ choice to migrate.24
In Table 3.9, I present evidence of the election of an NL mayor in a close contest
on Italian residents’ migration responses. In columns (1) and (2) it is possible to see
that Italian citizens are less attracted by the election of an NL mayor one year after a
close electoral race; the coefficient, however, is not statistically significant, regardless
of the specification adopted. Passing to the out-migration variables, Italians do not
move to a different city in response to the election of an NL mayor (column 3);
the inclusion of controls, in column (4), does not change my conclusions. Finally,
the coefficient on Italians’ net migration is statistically significant at the 10% level
(column 5), denoting a decrease in the difference between non-foreign in-migrants
24Considering that in 1990s the Northern League rhetoric was strong against Southern Italians,
it would be reasonable to expect a reduction in the number of Southern Italian citizens moving
to a city where an NL mayor was elected. However, this is unlikely to occur since, starting from
the 2000s, the Northern League has adopted a new communication strategy, also seeking votes,
directly or indirectly, in the Southern regions.
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Table 3.9: The Impact of NL mayors on internal migration - Italian
citizens
in-migration out-migration net-migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NL Mayor −7.068 −2.649 −1.491 2.719 −5.577∗ −2.439
(4.306) (3.253) (2.452) (2.048) (3.227) (2.389)
N 153 151 153 151 153 151
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
mean dep var. 26.011 22.841 3.170
h 0.135 0.135 0.135
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **,
and at the 1% level by ***. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std.
errors relative to the election of an NL mayor using the method developed by
Calonico et al. (2014), using a bandwidth equal to 0.135. Controls include city
(foreign population, Italian population, area, altitude, (log) number of firms
and (log) average income per capita expressed in 2010e), mayoral character-
istics (gender, education, incumbency status and age), year and region fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.
and out-migrants of 5.57 per 1,000 inhabitants. However, this result is not robust
to the inclusion of municipal and mayoral characteristics as well as year and region
fixed effects, as shown in column (6).
Overall these results reinforce the idea that the election by a narrow margin of
victory of a mayor affiliated to a party characterised by a strong xenophobic stance
will affect the migration decision of foreign citizens only. Italians’ choice to migrate,
on the contrary, does not respond to the election of a Northern League officer.
3.8 Robustness
The results presented so far confirm that foreign citizens living in Italy decide to
relocate to a different city in response to the election of a Northern League candidate.
On the contrary, the impact on foreign in-migrants and on the net migration rate is
not statistically significant at any conventional level. In what follows, I run a series
of tests aimed at establishing the strength of my findings.
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3.8.1 Increasing the Data Points
As a first robustness check, I increase the data points by looking at migration flows
of foreign citizens in the first two years after a close mayoral election involving the
participation of an NL candidate.
In Table 3.10, Columns (1) and (2) confirm that the impact of the election of
a Northern League mayor on the number of foreign in-migrants is not statistically
significant. Passing to the out-migration indicators, the close election of an NL
mayor increases the number of foreign out-migrants by 2.691 per 1,000 inhabitants
(column 3). The coefficient is significant at the 5% level. The inclusion of controls,
year and region fixed effects in column (4) decreases the size of the coefficient to
1.568 foreign citizens per 1,000 inhabitants moving to a different city; however, the
effect in this case is not statistically significant. Finally, in the last two columns,
it is possible to see a decrease in the foreign net migration rates in response to the
election of an NL mayor. Also in this case, the effect is not statistically significant
at any conventional level.
Table 3.10: RD estimates - The Impact of NL mayors on foreign
migration - first two years
in-migration out-migration net-migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NL Mayor 0.551 0.436 2.691∗∗ 1.568 −2.141 −1.132
(2.319) (1.525) 1.267 0.983 (1.616) (1.234)
N 298 294 298 294 298 294
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
h 0.135 0.135 0.135
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Each entry reports the RD coeffi-
cients and std. errors relative to the election of an NL mayor using the
method developed by Calonico et al. (2014), using a bandwidth equal
to 0.135. Controls include city (foreign population, Italian population,
area, altitude, (log) number of firms and (log) average income per capita
expressed in 2010e), mayoral characteristics (gender, education, incum-
bency status and age), year and region fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipal level.
The inclusion of migratory movements recorded in the second year after the close
election of an NL mayor seems to dampen the strong effect presented in Table 3.4.
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In Table 3.11 I link the election of an NL mayor to the foreign migration rates
recorded in the second year after the mayoral contest. The results confirm the ex-
istence of a short-run effect only, which fades away two years after the election of
an NL mayor.
Table 3.11: RD estimates - The Impact of NL mayors on foreign
migration - t+2
in-migration out-migration net-migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NL Mayor −0.019 −0.597 2.098 1.164 −2.117 −1.760
(2.151) (1.332) 1.711 1.235 (1.303) (1.089)
N 145 143 145 143 145 143
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
h 0.135 0.135 0.135
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Each entry reports the RD coeffi-
cients and std. errors relative to the election of an NL mayor using the
method developed by Calonico et al. (2014), using a bandwidth equal
to 0.135. Controls include city (foreign population, Italian population,
area, altitude, (log) number of firms and (log) average income per capita
expressed in 2010e), mayoral characteristics (gender, education, incum-
bency status and age), year and region fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipal level.
3.8.2 Breakthrough Elections
In this section I explore whether the impact of the election of a Northern League
mayor on foreign migration is stronger when a Northern League candidate is elected
for the first time in Italian municipalities.
Table 3.12 reports the estimates relative to breakthrough elections using the same
bandwidth computed by Calonico et al. (2014) adopted in Table 3.4, to facilitate the
comparability with the results presented in Section 3.5. From the first two columns,
the impact on foreign in-migration is not statistically significant at any conventional
level.
Passing to the foreign out-migration indicators, a positive and statistically signi-
ficant effect is found one year after the close election in a city of a Northern League
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Table 3.12: RD estimates - The Impact of NL mayors on foreign
migration - breakthrough elections
in-migration out-migration net-migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NL Mayor 1.366 −0.450 4.059∗∗ 2.665∗ −2.692 −3.116
(5.073) (4.385) (1.795) (1.612) (4.591) (4.191)
N 110 108 110 108 110 108
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
h 0.135 0.135 0.135
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Each entry reports the RD coefficients
and std. errors relative to the election of an NL mayor using the method
developed by Calonico et al. (2014), using a bandwidth equal to 0.135.
Controls include city (foreign population, Italian population, area, alti-
tude, (log) number of firms and (log) average income per capita expressed
in 2010e), mayoral characteristics (gender, education, incumbency status
and age), year and region fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipal level.
candidate for the first time. The magnitude of the coefficient, 4.05 foreign out-
migrants per 1,000 inhabitants, presented in column (3), is bigger than the estimate
obtained using all the observations within the optimal-bandwidth. In column (4),
the inclusion of controls, year and region fixed effects, reduces the size of the coeffi-
cient. Overall, the reduced sample size decreases the precision of these estimates, as
reflected in relatively larger standard errors, making them significant at the 5% and
the 10% level, respectively. Finally, no significant effect is detected on the impact
of a Northern League mayor on foreign net migration.
3.8.3 Municipal Electoral Law
The different rules established by the municipal electoral law for towns/cities below
or above 15,000 inhabitants can directly influence the behaviour of political parties
and civic lists running for the mayoral office. If on one hand in small municipalities
mayors are supported by a single list, on the other hand, in larger municipalities
mayors may be supported by a coalition of lists (or parties) in order to maximise the
probability of winning the election. In the second case, in municipality where the
Northern League is strong, the party might decide to run alone or it might impose
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its own candidate to the coalition partners.
In order to shed light on this aspect I exclude the municipalities with more than
15,000 inhabitants and re-estimate model (3.1).
Table 3.13 displays the results adopting the same bandwidths presented in Table
3.4, to favour the comparability across the two sets of estimates. The sample size
does not present significant differences if compared to Table 3.4.25 The estimates
relative to the foreign internal in-migration indicators are not significant at any
conventional level. The effect on foreign out-migration is positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level, whilst the inclusion of controls decreases the size of the
coefficient from 2.859 to 2.077, which remains significant at the 5% level.
Table 3.13: RD estimates - The impact of NL mayors on foreign
internal migration - small municipalities
in-migration out-migration net-migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NL Mayor 0.878 0.467 2.859∗∗ 2.077∗∗ −1.981 −1.610
(2.916) (2.178) (1.240) (0.987) (2.612) (2.091)
N 148 146 148 146 148 146
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
h 0.135 0.135 0.135
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Each entry reports the RD coefficients
and std. errors relative to the election of an NL mayor using the method
developed by Calonico et al. (2014), using a bandwidth equal to 0.135.
Controls include city (foreign population, Italian population, area, alti-
tude, (log) number of firms and (log) average income per capita expressed
in 2010e), mayoral characteristics (gender, education, incumbency status
and age), year and region fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipal level.
3.8.4 Parametric Estimator
The results presented so far are based on a nonparametric estimator. In what follows,
to determine whether my results are sensitive to the use of different estimators, I
exploit a parametric procedure. This is implemented retaining all the elections in the
25This is not surprising, given that the Italian cities and towns above 15,000 inhabitants are just
the 9% of all municipalities.
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sample where a Northern League candidate competes against a nominee affiliated to
a different party or civic list. The variation coming from the observations far away
from the cut-off point is absorbed by the polynomial specification of the running
variable. The proper order of the polynomial regression is still open to debate in the
RDD literature. In this case, I follow Porter (2003) and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009),
according to which odd polynomial orders present better econometric properties.
migrationm,t+1 = β0 + β1NLm,t + β2f(MVm,t) + β3f(MVm,t)×NLm,t + um,t+1 (3.2)
In Table 3.14, for each migration indicator I present the estimates relative to the
election of a Northern League mayor using a cubic polynomial term, allowing for
different slopes on both sides of the cut-off, as indicated by model (3.2).
Table 3.14: RD estimates - The impact of NL mayors on
foreign migration - parametric estimator
in-migration out-migration net-migration
(1) (2) (3)
NL Mayor 1.712 1.802∗ −0.0905
(1.689) (0.973) (1.553)
N 398 398 398
Polyn. Spec Flex. Cubic Flex. Cubic Flex. Cubic
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the
5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. Each entry reports
the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the election of
an NL mayor using a parametric estimator. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level.
The absence of a statistically significant effect on the foreign in-migration indic-
ator (columns 1 and 2) estimated using a parametric estimator confirms the results
obtained using the CCT nonparametric method. Passing to foreign out-migration,
the election of an NL mayor causes an increase of 1.802 foreign citizens per 1,000
inhabitants moving to a different city one year after the electoral race; the effect is
statistically significant at the 10% level. Compared to Table 3.4, the adoption of
a parametric estimator approximately halves the size of the coefficient of the out-
migration indicator. Finally, the last columns in Table 3.14 confirm the absence of
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a statistically significant result relative to the net migration variable.
3.9 Conclusions
This study analyses how foreign migration responds to the partisanship of local
politicians, by looking at the election of a Northern League mayor against a candid-
ate affiliated to a civic list, or to a different political party or coalition. Exploiting a
nonparametric regression discontinuity design, I am able to isolate the endogeneity
of the election of an NL mayor at city level, by focusing on closely contested electoral
races only.
Overall, I find that foreign citizens move to a different city in response to the
election of a mayor affiliated to the Northern League party; on the other hand, the
effect on in-migration from different Italian cities is not statistically significant at
any conventional level. Foreign international in- and out-migration is not affected
by the election of a Northern League mayor.
The second part of this work provides an assessment of one of the possible motives
that might explain why foreign internal emigration is positively affected by the
election of a Northern League mayor, namely a decreased perception of integration
towards non-Italian residents.
As a first test, in this paper I show that one year after the close election of a
Northern League candidate, the number of Italian citizenship acquisitions decreases
considerably.
Anecdotal evidence has largely documented Northern League mayors’ propensity
to deny Italian nationality status to foreign citizens unable to swear the oath of al-
legiance in Italian. This, in turn, could signal a diminished perception of social
inclusion towards non-Italian residents, leading foreign citizens to migrate to differ-
ent cities. As a second test, I show that Italian inhabitants do not move to different
cities one year after the election of a candidate affiliated to a xenophobic party.
In order to establish whether such findings are robust, I increase the number of
data points, look at breakthrough elections and adopt a parametric estimator: in
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all cases foreign out-migration increases in response to the election of a Northern
League mayor.
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Chapter 4
Papal Visits and Abortions -
Evidence from Italy
4.1 Introduction
Each day approximately 153,000 pregnancies are terminated around the world (Sedgh
et al., 2016). The decision to undergo an abortion is often associated with consider-
able stress and anxiety. For example, Coleman et al. (2009) show that women who
abort are at a higher risk of a variety of mental health problems including anxiety,
mood and substance abuse disorders when compared to women without a history of
abortion. While access to abortion has become more widely available in an increas-
ing number of countries, abortion remains a controversial procedure, facing legal
restrictions and hostile social norms Norris et al. (2011). As documented by Yegon
et al. (2016) in their study on Kenya, women who chose abortions are labeled as
killers and are perceived to exert a bad influence on young women.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of papal visits to Italian provinces
between 1979 to 2012 on the number of abortions. The Pope is the emblem of
Catholic doctrine. Papal visits to Italian provinces generate intense local media
coverage and considerable excitement among the local clergy and population alike.
The heightened saliency of Catholic Church doctrine during papal visits can impact
the number of abortions through a number of plausible channels. The Catholic
Church strongly condemns deliberate termination of pregnancy. The stigma at-
tached to abortions may become more salient during and in the aftermath of papal
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visits, which can directly affect the demand for, and the supply of abortions. Women
facing unplanned pregnancies may be less likely to abort. Abortion providers may
also become more reluctant to do the procedure unless medically necessary. The
number of abortions may be indirectly affected by a change in the number of un-
planned pregnancies. Such pregnancies could go up in number if there is a decrease in
contraceptive usage. The Catholic Church has traditionally opposed contraception.
Alternatively, the number of unplanned pregnancies could decrease if there is a de-
crease in the frequency of non-procreational sexual intercourse. Women (or couples)1
may reduce the frequency of non-procreational sexual intercourse as the Catholic
Church frowns upon sexual relations unless in the context of procreation. Another
reason to reduce the frequency of non-procreational sexual intercourse would be to
avoid the risk of an unplanned pregnancy and the associated dilemma of whether
to abort or not.
Our choice to focus on Italy is motivated by three factors. First, Italy is predom-
inantly Catholic and one of the five countries with the highest number of Catholics
(Pew Research Center, 2013). Second, due to the geographical proximity to the
Vatican, Italy is the country with the highest number of papal visits viz. 125 in our
sample period, increasing the statistical power of our research design. While one
could argue that Italians may be “accustomed” to the papal presence, as he lives
in Rome and often visits Italian cities and towns, we document that Papal visits
within Italy dominate local media coverage and generate considerable excitement.
Finally, since 1979 the Italian National Institute of Statistics has collected inform-
ation on all the abortion events occurred in Italy with a high detail of geographical
identification, allowing us to construct a quarterly and monthly panel of abortion
counts at the provincial level. We employ an event study methodology to map out
the response in the count of abortions during and immediately after papal visits.
Our main result is a large and statistically significant drop in the number of
1Henceforth, when we mention women, we imply women or couples as the relevant decisions on
engaging in sexual intercourse, using contraception, or deciding to abort are likely to involve not
just the woman but also her partner.
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abortions starting the first quarter after the papal visit and persisting until the fourth
quarter. Specifically, we measure a decline in abortions ranging approximately from
9% to 19%.
The observed decrease in the number of pregnancy terminations is consistent
with reduced demand and/or supply of abortion due to the heightened perception of
the stigma attached to the abortions under Catholic doctrine. Alternatively, women
could opt for “back-street” abortions to keep the procedure secret, causing a problem
of under-reporting. However, there are two reasons why heightened stigma attached
to abortions does not appear to be the main explanation for the observed decline.
First, in this case one would predict that the decline in abortions would commence
contemporaneously with the papal visit. There is no such contemporaneous drop -
the number of abortions only start to decrease 2-3 months after the visit. Second, we
find no significant increase in births after the papal visit. During the study period,
Italy had a non-trivial abortion rate of about 20%. A back of the envelope calculation
would predict that, ceteris paribus, live births should increase by about 3.7% nine
months after the decline in abortions.2 It is worth noting that, independently of the
effect on abortions, papal visits would be expected to boost fertility in the short run
through an increase in desired fertility or reduced contraceptive usage.
We argue that the empirical findings are most consistent with a reduction in the
frequency of unplanned pregnancies that commences around the time of the papal
visit and persists for several months. Since pregnancies are typically detected 6-8
weeks after conception, one would expect to find a reduction in abortions 2-3 months
after the papal visit. Further, a reduced incidence of unplanned pregnancies would
not only reduce abortions but also the number of live births 9 months later since not
all unplanned pregnancies end in abortion. While we do not observe any decrease in
births, that could be due to the countervailing effect of any boost in desired fertility
due to the papal visit.
2Assuming a 15% decline in abortions and using an abortion rate of 20%, for every 100 preg-
nancies an additional 0.15 × 20 = 3 babies would be carried to term. That in turn maps to
approximately 3.7% more births.
77
What could be causing the reduction in unplanned pregnancies? Women might
reduce the frequency of non-procreational sexual intercourse. Less plausibly, they
may increase contraceptive usage during non-procreational sexual intercourse. We
do not have data on contraceptive usage to test the latter hypothesis. However, given
the stance of the Catholic Church on contraception, it appears unlikely that papal
visits increase contraceptive usage. A plausible channel may be increased religiosity
triggered by papal visits that reduces the frequency of non-procreational sexual
intercourse. We cannot test this hypothesis directly in the absence of individual
survey data that measures sexual activity. However, we find suggestive evidence
that increased religiosity, as proxied by regular church attendance, may be playing
a role. We find that the reduction in abortions is concentrated among low educated
and married women. As we will show in section 4.7.1, married women also show the
biggest increase in religiosity during papal visits.
This paper contributes to a number of different literatures. First, we shed addi-
tional light on the determinants of abortion. The economic literature on abortions
can be traced back to seminal work by Becker (1991) and Rosenzweig and Schultz
(1983). They model children as an investment producing benefits over time. Con-
traception and abortion are seen as methods for achieving the number of children
desired by the household. More recent research has studied how the demand for
abortion responds to changes in public policies. Blank et al. (1996) and Levine
et al. (1996) show that the enactment of restrictions on Medicaid funding is correl-
ated with a decline in abortion rates in the US. Joyce and Kaestner (1996) show that
parental involvement laws have no impact on the probability of abortion for minor
in the US, with the only exception of South Carolina, where a negative and statist-
ically significant effects is found for 16 years old non-black minors. Levine (2003)
contributes to the literature on parental involvement laws showing a reduction in
the abortion rates for younger teens, but not for older teens or adult women. A new
stream of research has shed light on the causal effect of media coverage on fertility
choices. Kearney and Levine (2015), for example, focus on a TV show documenting
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the problems and difficulties faced by teen childbearing. They find a reduction in
teen births, which could take place through an increased interest in contraceptive
use and abortion.
Second, we add to the growing body of evidence that religion is one of the key
factors influencing individuals’ socio-economic behaviours (Iannaccone, 1998; Guiso
et al., 2003; McCleary and Barro, 2006; Iyer, 2016). In this context, our paper is
closely related to a recent paper by Bassi and Rasul (2016) on the effect of papal
visits on fertility-related beliefs and behaviour in Brazil. They exploit the fortuitous
timing of the 1991 DHS survey in Brazil which was fielded in the weeks before, during
and after the papal visit to study how the short-run beliefs and long-run behaviour
of individuals respond to the Pope’s messages of persuasion. The authors analyse
the fertility responses to persuasion, finding a significant increase in the hazard rate
for births nine months post-visit. We complement Bassi and Rasul (2016) using
administrative records to study the impact on fertility outcomes such as abortion
and to a lesser extent births. To the best of our knowledge no study before has
sought to measure the effect of heightened religious sentiment on the number of
abortions or used administrative data to precisely estimate the effect of the papal
visits on the number of births.
Finally and more broadly, the paper contributes to a growing literature focused
on the impact of role models on behaviour. Beaman et al. (2009) and Beaman et al.
(2012) show that exposure to a female politician reduces gender stereotypes and in-
fluences adolescent girls’ career aspirations and educational attainment. DellaVigna
(2010) uses an event study methodology to explore how Obama’s election affects
racial discrimination against Blacks and economic outcomes for Blacks by changing
perceptions. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) analyse how individual managers affect
corporate behavior and performance. Jones and Olken (2005) investigate the im-
pact of national leaders on economic growth. Stroebel and Van Benthem (2013) use
the appointment of local bishops in Kenya to study the impact of church authorities’
teaching on sexual behaviour.
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the institutional setting.
Section 4.3 describes the data on abortion and the papal visits. Section 4.4 presents
evidence on the impact of the papal visits on the number of pregnancy terminations.
Section 4.5 analyses who responds to the Pope whilst section 4.6 estimates the
impact of the papal visits on live-births. Section 4.7 discusses the main channels
through which the papal visits could affect the number of abortions and presents
further tests. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Institutional Setting
Italy is a predominantly Catholic country. Historically the Church has exerted a
strong influence on the Italian culture. For example, the current Italian education
system requires the teaching of the Catholic religion in all schools below the Univer-
sity level due to the Lateran Treaties, an agreement between the Italian Kingdom
and the Holy See signed by Mussolini during the fascist regime. Since the insti-
tutional referendum in 1946, in which the Italian population voted to abolish the
monarchy, the Vatican tried to actively condition the political course of the republic.
For example, in 1948 the Church supported the Christian Democratic party against
the Communist Party presenting the election as a conflict between good and evil.
In 1974, the Italian Bishop conference strongly supported the initiative in favour of
the promotion of the referendum repealing the law on divorce passed in 1970.3 Sim-
ilarly, after an abortion bill became law in 1978, the Pope and the Italian Bishops’
Conference promoted the attempt to restrict abortion in the referendum proposed
by the right-to-life movement in 1981.
Vezzoni and Biolcati-Rinaldi (2015) have documented a declining trend in reli-
giosity in Italy since the late 1960s until 2010, in spite of a period of stability in
the 1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless, Italy today remains one of the countries with
the highest number of Catholics, which comprised 71% of the population in 2016
3As reported by Wertman (1982), the Italian Bishops’ Conference issued a document arguing
that opting for divorce would be an act of disobedience for Catholics.
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(Eurispes, 2016).
According to the Catholic doctrine, family represents the original cell of social
life, where individuals learn moral values from childhood. The creation of the nuclear
family cannot prescind from marriage, seen as a covenant linking a man and a woman
for the rest of their lives. Sexuality is only admitted within the wedlock, and if aimed
at fulfilling the twofold obligation of the “good of the spouses” and the transmission
of life.4 In the light of this perception adopted by the Church, divorces, the recourse
to sterilisation, the use of contraceptives and abortion5 are seen as “a sign of the
refusal that man gives to the love of God” (John Paul II, 1981)
Voluntary pregnancy termination in Italy became legal in May 1978, with the
approval of the Law 194/78 by the Italian Parliament. Abortions are performed
free-of-charge in public hospitals or in private structures authorised by the regional
health authorities.
Women at least eighteen years old6 can request a termination of pregnancy during
the first 90 days for health, economic or social reasons. Abortions are also allowed
in the second trimester of the pregnancy if the life of the woman would be at risk if
the pregnancy is carried to term or the foetus presents genetic malformations which
would expose the mother to a risk of serious psychological or physical consequences.
After a woman obtains the medical authorisation, a period of seven days has to
occur before the date of the abortion operation, unless an immediate intervention
is required due to the presence of risks for the woman’s health conditions. The
abortion operation is generally performed eight to thirty days after a woman obtains
the medical authorisation. During the Question Time on 19 April 2017, the Minister
of Health Beatrice Lorenzin claimed that 65.3% of voluntary pregnancy terminations
4See, for example, the Catechism of the Catholic Church at the following link: http://www.
vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a6.htm.
5In a survey from year 2016, 83.2% of the people interviewed report to be in favour of the
abortion in case of danger for the mother while only the 18.6% of people think abortion is acceptable
if a woman doesn’t want to have children (Eurispes, 2016).
6For women below eighteen, permission must be sought from their legal guardian. In the event
of refusal, a judge may intervene with an injunction, within five days of the request if there are
sufficient legal reasons.
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are performed within 14 days since the medical authorisation.7
Figure 4.1 presents the ratio of the voluntary pregnancy terminations to spon-
taneous abortions at the national level relative to the period 1980-2012. In spite of
a strong negative trend mostly driven by a steady decrease in the number of volun-
tary abortions, in 2012 voluntary pregnancy terminations outnumbered the cases of
spontaneous abortions.
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Figure 4.1: Voluntary to spontaneous abortion rate - National Counts.
From 1979 to 2012 John Paul II and Benedict XVI made 125 official visits to
87 provinces within Italy8(see Appendix C, Figure C.1). Even though the Vatican
is located within Italy, papal visits generate considerable excitement within local
clergy and population, and there is intense local media coverage. We document
anecdotal evidence on the differential coverage that media from treated provinces
dedicate to a papal visit as compared to the media in those provinces not visited by
the Pontiff. In order to do so, we randomly pick two visits and, for each of them, we
count the number of articles dedicated to the Pope in a) the local newspaper from
the treated province, b) the local newspaper from a province non treated and c) a
national newspaper in a 7-days window enveloping the event9.
We start with the trip of John Paul II in February 1984 to the province of Bari,
the 7th most populous Italian province, and examine the coverage of the visit in three
7See, for example, Magnano (2017).
8We decided to exclude the visits of Pope Francis I from our analysis because the data on
abortions from 2013 were not available.
9In the specific case, we randomly selected two papal events. Hence, for each visit we made a
list of all the remaining provinces and randomly picked a province as a control.
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newspapers: La Gazzetta Del Mezzogiorno (local), Il Mattino di Napoli (non-local)
and Il Corriere della Sera (National).
Table 4.1: Media Coverage
before event after
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Bari
Local 16 30 11
Non Local 0 1 1
National 0 1 1
Panel B: Palermo
Local 12 10 14
Non Local 0 0 1
National 0 1 2
Note: Each entry reports the number of articles on the
papal visits taken from a) a newspaper established in the
province hosting the Pope (local), b) a newspaper estab-
lished in a province non-hosting the Pope (non local) and
a national newspaper (national). The articles refer to the
three days before the event (column 1), the day of the visit
(column 2) and the 3 days after the event (column 3). Panel
A refers to the papal visit to Bari in February 1984 whilst
Panel B reports information on the visit to Palermo, oc-
curred in October 2010.
In Table 4.1 - Panel A, we show the number of articles on the papal visits to the
province of Bari in the 3 days before the visit (column 1), on the day of the event
(column 2) and in the 3 days following the visit (column 3). Prior to the event we
count 16 articles in the local newspaper in Bari. This number spikes to 30 on the day
of the event while in the following 3 days we count 11 different articles. In contrast,
the Non-local and the National newspapers both carry only one article each on the
day of the visit, and in the 3 days after the event.
The second visit we study took place in Palermo in October 2010, during the
reign of Benedict XVI. In this case we compare the number of articles from the
newspaper La Sicilia (Local) with the news coverage in the province of Genova on
the event occurred in Palermo10 and the national newspaper Il Corriere della Sera.
As we can see, also in this case the number of articles on the papal visits from the
local newspaper is considerably high when compared to the coverage in the non-local
10We now use Il Secolo XIX as the non-local newspaper.
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and the National newspapers. To give the reader a flavour of the type of coverage,
Figure C.2 and Figure C.3 in Appendix C display a selection of articles extracted
from La Gazzetta Del Mezzogiorno and La Sicilia.
Overall such a marked difference in media coverage presented for the two papal
visits displayed in this section offers reinforcing evidence in favour of the strong
influence that the Pope exerts on the local population during his official trips. In
contrast, the importance of such religious events does not seem to be excessively
stressed by the media in the provinces not hosting the Pope.11
Table 4.2: Text analysis
Family Abortion Sex-Contrac. Chastity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Keywords 0.6381 0.0544 0.0161 0.0312
(0.481) (0.227) (0.126) (0.174)
Note: Each entry reports mean and standard deviation in parentheses relative
to the number of keywords per speech held during the papal visits.
It is worth noting that the papal visits expose individuals to persuasive messages
related to Catholic Church doctrine. The contents of the speeches is typically in line
with mainstream Catholic doctrine and, as a consequence, they do not provide any
new information to Catholics. Nonetheless, as remarked by Bassi and Rasul (2016),
non-informative dimensions of communication can influence belief formation through
salience, attention and framing.
Using the information made available by the Vatican papal Archives, we study
how frequently the Pope refers to abortion or other themes that could influence indi-
viduals’ fertility choices in his speeches. In Table 4.2 we present summary statistics
relative to our text analysis, focusing on five keywords, i.e. family, abortion, sex-
contraception and chastity. On average the Pope refers to family in approximately
the 63.8% of his speeches, confirming the centrality of the family unit according to
the Catholic doctrine. The frequency is considerably lower when we look at the
word “abortion” (5.44%), “chastity” (3.12%) and “sex” or “contraception” (1.61%).
11Unfortunately we do not have information on TV and radio coverage of such events; nonetheless
it is reasonable to expect local broadcasters to devote more time to the visit of the Pope, if compared
to a broadcaster from a different area.
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4.3 Data and Events
We generate an event binary indicator mapping each town visited by the Pope in
a given quarter of year to the corresponding province.12 Due to the presence of
multiple destinations within the same visit, we identify 173 episodes (called Pope
Events hereafter) in which the Italian provinces were visited by the Pope in a given
quarter of year.13
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics - papal Visits
All Visits JP-II B-XVI
1979-2012 1979-2004 2005-2012
(1) (2) (3)
# papal Visits 125 95 30
# Pope Events 173 141 32
# Provinces visited 87 84 26
Pope Events/Year 4.404 4.766 2.812
# Provinces 110 103 110
Note: Authors’ calculations.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 4.3. The number of provinces visited
by the Pope from 1979 to 2012 amounts to 87 out of 110; on average the Pope visited
4.4 provinces per year. The last two columns in Table 4.3 offer a comparison between
John Paul II’s papacy (column 2) and Benedict XVI’s one (column 3). It is worth
noting that the number of provinces visited per year by Pope John Paul II is on
average higher than Benedict XVI’s visits, reflecting John Paul’s proverbial higher
propensity to travel, from which the appellations Globetrotter Pope or Voyager Pope
derive.14
12Italian provinces are administrative units between a municipality and a region, corresponding
to NUTS-3 regions according to the European Union classification. Several municipalities form
a province while several provinces form a region (Valle d’Aosta is the sole exception, since the
provincial functions are exercised by the region.). Provinces fulfil three main functions, i.e. local
planning and zoning, provision of local police and fire services and, finally, transportation regulation
such as car registration or maintenance of local roads. In 2012 there were 110 provinces, even
though the number has been steadily growing in recent years.
13The number of Pope Events does not change when we conduct our analysis at the monthly
level.
14 See for example the article by Danesi (N A).
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Figure 4.2: Yearly Abortions - National Counts.
Following the legalisation of abortion in Italy, the data on induced abortions
performed in public and private clinics certified and authorised by the Italian re-
gions are provided since 1979 by the Italian National Institute of Statistics together
with the Italian regions and the Ministry of Health. The survey requires the doc-
tor performing the termination of pregnancy to collect important information on
the socio-economic status of the patient such as date and place of birth, place of
residence, marital status, educational level and work status. Information on the
operation are also provided, such as date of pregnancy interruption, province of the
operation, length of stay in hospital and presence of complications.
In Figure 4.2 we present the number of yearly abortions for the period 1979-
2012 at the national level. The strong increase in the early 80s in response to the
legalisation of abortion has been followed by a steady decrease over time.
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics - Abortions
(1979-2012)
Quarters Months
(1) (2)
# tot abortions 384.14 128.05
(558.40) (187.56)
Note: The entries in columns (1) and (2) present
the average and standard deviation in paren-
theses relative to the provincial number of abor-
tions grouped at the province-quarter of year and
monthly level, respectively.
In order to study the impact of the visits of the Pope to the Italian provinces, we
aggregate the number of abortions at the province-quarter of year level. The reason
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we do not exploit a finest degree of geographical identification focusing on the cities
and towns visited by the Pope is motivated by the fact that the data on abortions
are available at the provincial level only. In Table 4.4 we report the descriptive
statistics relative to the provincial number of abortions aggregated at the quarter
of year (column 1) and monthly level (column 2).
4.4 Effect on Abortions
To study the impact of the papal visits to the Italian provinces on the number of
abortions, we estimate the following model:
ln(np,q) = α+β
pre
j
j=−2∑
j=−1
prej +β
post
k
k=4∑
k=0
postk + θp + θy +
l=4∑
l=1
λl +γp× t+ δp× t2 +up,q
(4.1)
where np,q represents the number abortions in province p in the quarter of year
q ; prej are placebo dummy variables capturing any impact of the papal visits on
abortions in the two quarters prior to the visit; postk are post-event dummies envel-
oping the Pope Event (post0 = 1) up to the fourth quarter after the papal visits in
a given province. θp and θy represent province and year fixed effects; λl are calendar
quarters dummy variables capturing possible seasonalities. γp× t and δp× t2, finally,
represent province specific yearly linear and quadratic trends, respectively. In the
most rigorous specification, we augment model (4.1) by controlling for quarters of
year fixed effects and province specific quarters of year linear and quadratic trends.
Table 4.5 shows the results for the number of abortions. We observe that the es-
timates are stable across different specifications; reassuringly, the pre-event dummy
indicators are not statistically significant at any conventional level. Focusing on our
preferred specification that is also the most stringent one - column (4) - we can see
a strong reduction in the number of abortions in the provinces visited by the Pope
starting from the first quarter after the papal visits. The size of the effect is quite
substantial, since it varies between −9.57% (post1) and −18.70% (post3). When
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compared to the average provincial number of abortions per quarter of year presen-
ted in Table 4.4, this corresponds to a reduction varying approximately between 37
and 72 abortions15.
Table 4.5: The impact of the papal Visits on Abortions - Quarterly
ln(abor) ln(abor) ln(abor) ln(abor)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pre2 0.00058 −0.01642 0.00248 −0.01243
(0.0225) (0.0230) (0.0233) (0.0246)
pre1 0.02060 0.00501 0.01670 0.00003
(0.0200) (0.0240) (0.0204) (0.0239)
post0 0.01128 −0.00488 0.01202 −0.00409
(0.0197) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0178)
post1 −0.09037 −0.10692∗ −0.08577 −0.10062∗
(0.0583) (0.0572) (0.0588) (0.0573)
post2 −0.12438∗ −0.14002∗∗ −0.12075∗ −0.13484∗∗
(0.0648) (0.0621) (0.0654) (0.0627)
post3 −0.19682∗∗ −0.20004∗∗ −0.20240∗∗∗ −0.20706∗∗
(0.0761) (0.0788) (0.0766) (0.0793)
post4 −0.14572∗∗ −0.14787∗∗ −0.14599∗∗ −0.14874∗∗
(0.0720) (0.0741) (0.0727) (0.0749)
N 12762 12762 12762 12762
R2 0.81265 0.87458 0.81324 0.87457
Province f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year f.e. Yes Yes No No
Calendar Quarters f.e. Yes Yes No No
Quarters f.e. No No Yes Yes
Prov. yearly trends No Yes No No
Prov. quarterly trends No No No Yes
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and
at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the coefficients and std. errors relative
to the papal visits on the provincial quarterly number of abortions. Std. errors
are clustered at the provincial level.
To better capture the dynamics of the number of pregnancies voluntarily ter-
minated in response to the papal visits, we run monthly event study regressions, as
specified by the following model:
15A possible concern is the fact that women might seek an abortion operation in a province
different from the one visited by the Pope. However, this is unlikely to invalidate our results, as
approximately 88% of pregnancy terminations are performed in the women’s province of residence,
as reported by the Minister of Health Beatrice Lorenzin during her Question Time on 19 April
2017. For the sake of completeness we have re-estimated model (4.1) aggregating the number of
abortions by the patient’s province of residence. The results, available upon request, confirm the
main findings presented in Table 4.5.
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ln(np,m) = α+β
pre
j
j=−4∑
j=−1
prej +β
post
k
k=12∑
k=0
postk+θp+θy+
l=12∑
l=1
λl+γp×t+δp×t2+up,m
(4.2)
where np,m represents the number of abortions in province p in month m; prej
are placebo dummy variables capturing the impact of the papal visits on the number
of abortions occurred in the four months preceding to the visit; postk are post-event
dummies enveloping the Pope Event (post0 = 1) up to the 12
th month after the
papal visits in a given province. θp and θy represent province and year fixed effects;
λl are calendar months dummy variables capturing possible seasonalities. γp × t
and δp × t2, finally, represent province specific yearly linear and quadratic trends,
respectively.
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Figure 4.3: Monthly Event Study - Abortions
In Figure 4.3 we plot the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the most
rigorous specification of model (4.2), controlling for months fixed effects, province
specific monthly linear and quadratic trends. The pre-event indicators are not stat-
istically significant at any conventional level and the size of the coefficients is close
to 0. The variable post0 is positive but not-significant at any conventional level,
allowing us to rule out the presence of a contemporaneous effect of the Pope on
the number of abortions. We find a strong and statistically significant effect start-
ing from the 3rd to the 11th month following the visits of the Pope to the Italian
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provinces. The effects are statistically significant and the magnitude is considerable,
varying between −8.09% (post3) and −19.20% (post9); if compared to the provin-
cial monthly average, this corresponds to a reduction in the number of monthly
abortions varying approximately between 10 and 25 operations with respect to the
provinces not visited by the Pope.
One plausible story relates to reduced demand and/or supply of abortion due
to the heightened perception of the stigma attached to the abortions under Cath-
olic doctrine. Women may be less likely to choose to abort. Alternatively (or
additionally) there may be a constriction in supply i.e. an increased reluctance of
abortion providers to do the procedure. Another related possibility is that there is
under-reporting of the procedure around the time of the visit. This could happen
for instance if women switch to using “unofficial” abortion providers to keep the
procedure secret, or because they perceive reluctance on part of official abortion
providers. However, in any of these cases, one would expect to see a contemporan-
eous drop in abortions. There is no such drop - the number of abortions only start
to decrease about 3 months after the visit. Therefore, it is unlikely that heightened
stigma attached to abortions explains our findings. However, as we discuss later, it
may still play a role indirectly by inducing women to reduce the frequency of sexual
intercourse to avoid the risk of unplanned pregnancy.
The timing of the effect coincides with when one would expect to see abortions
for pregnancies that commence around the time of the visit. Most pregnancies are
typically detected around 6 to 8 weeks after conception, and presumably women
who discover an unplanned pregnancy still take a few more weeks to abort as they
need to first decide and then schedule an abortion. This suggests that the reduction
in abortions is occurring among women who conceive around the time of the papal
visits. Abortions are most likely to occur in the case of unplanned pregnancies.16
16They could also occur in planned pregnancies on medical grounds or if the woman or couple
changes its mind. However, most abortions are related to unplanned pregnancies. For instance,
Finer and Henshaw (2006) indicate that less than 5 percent of abortions in the US were were
intended pregnancies at the time of conception. Likewise, Schu¨nmann and Glasier (2006) find that
92% of women undergoing an abortion operation in Scotland did not plan their pregnancy.
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This in turn suggests that papal visits may be reducing unplanned pregnancies.
This could come about through less frequent sexual intercourse or increased use of
contraception during sex. The former may be more plausible in this context than
the latter. Church doctrine frowns upon sex unless it is with the intention of procre-
ation. Contraceptive usage is explicitly discouraged because it breaks the connection
between sex and reproduction within marriage and encourages recreational sex out
of wedlock.17
4.5 Who Responds to the Papal Visits?
We exploit socio-demographic information of women deciding to undergo an abor-
tion operation to understand who is more influenced by the Pope. In Table 4.6 -
column (1) - we present the summary statistics on the number of abortions classified
according to the age, the education level and marital status of women who decide to
terminate their pregnancies. In column (2), we present the ratio of abortions to live
births for each group. Between 1979 and 2012, nation-wide approximately 5 million
abortions-episodes were registered. The abortion rate is the highest for women aged
19 years or younger - about half the pregnancies are aborted in this group. The
abortion rate is also high for women aged 40 years or more. In this group about
45% of the pregnancies are aborted; in large part presumably on medical grounds
since pregnancies tend to be riskier for older women. Notably though, the abortion
rate is non-trivial for all other age groups, and women aged 25 to 34 years account
for more than 44% of all abortions.
Also, women who have completed lower secondary school education account for
almost 43% of all abortions.18 The abortion rates cannot be calculated by educa-
tional attainment since this information is not available for mothers due to changes
in data collection on births starting from 1999. Unsurprisingly, the abortion rate
17In the Encyclical Letter Humanae Vitae, Paul VI in reference to contraceptives states that
“human beings - and especially the young, who are so exposed to temptation - need incentives to
keep the moral law, and it is an evil thing to make it easy for them to break that law”.
18According to the Italian educational system, this corresponds to 8 years of education, including
elementary school.
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is much higher for unmarried women but married women account for the majority
(about 59%) of abortions.
Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics - Abortions (1979-2012) - Women’s
Demographics.
Abortions Abortion Rate
(1) (2)
Panel A - Age Category
Not reported 12, 100 9.68%
Age≤ 19 460, 932 49.75%
20 ≤Age≤ 24 993, 223 24.65%
25 ≤Age≤ 29 1, 128, 878 17.03%
30 ≤Age≤ 34 1, 121, 674 17.62%
35 ≤Age≤ 39 926, 822 25.90%
Age≥ 40 490, 988 45.17%
Panel B - Education Lv.
Not reported 280, 175 −
Elementary school 1, 345, 696 −
Lower secondary school 2, 172, 676 −
Upper secondary school 1, 188, 268 −
Higher Education 147, 802 −
Panel C - Marital Status
Unmarried 2, 125, 774 54.65%
Married 3, 008, 843 16.09%
N 5, 134, 617 22.58%
Note: Column (1) reports the number of abortions for each subcategory
occurred from 1979 to 2012. Column (2) displays the abortion rate, defined
as abortions/(abortions+ births).
We re-estimate model (4.2) for subgroups of population to understand who re-
sponds to the papal visits. For the sake of brevity and readability, we graph the
estimate for the strictest specifications, including province-specific monthly trends.
In Figure 4.4 we present the impact of the papal events on the number of abor-
tions for three age groups, i.e. women 24 years old or younger, women older than
24 and younger than 35 and, finally, women whose age is greater or equal than 35.
Once again, reassuringly, the placebo indicators (pre-event) are not significant re-
gardless of the specification adopted. The graphs indicate that the papal visit has a
roughly similar sized lagged negative effect on the number of abortions for all three
age groups. The drop in the number of abortions is observed starting from the 3rd
month after the papal visits and persist until the 11th month (the 10th month in the
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(b) 25 ≤ Age ≤ 34
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(c) Age ≥ 35
Figure 4.4: Monthly Event Study - Age Category
case of women aged 25-34).
Figure 4.5 shows how the papal visits to the Italian provinces affect the number
of abortions for women classified according to their marital status. In both cases the
Pontiff has a negative effect on the monthly number of abortions, as we can see from
panel (a) and (b). However, the effects appear to be smaller and often insignificant
for unmarried women. In contrast, the magnitude of the effect on married women
is almost twice as large, and therefore usually highly significant.
Turning to educational attainment, we adopt a new classification, grouping wo-
men undergoing an abortion operation into low educated and high educated women,
where the former encompasses women with no education, primary school and lower
secondary school education whereas the latter includes women with higher secondary
education and university degree.
Figure 4.6 shows that both subgroups respond to papal visits with a reduction in
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(b) Married
Figure 4.5: Monthly Event Study - Marital Status.
abortions. However, lower educated women respond more strongly; the coefficients
are negative and statistically significant from the third to the eleventh month. For
highly educated women, the post-event dummy coefficients are often not significant
at any conventional level, with few exceptions (post-5, post-7 and post-9, significant
at the 10% level). The standard errors obtained from the regressions estimated for
this group are comparable to those obtained for the low educated group; however,
the size of the coefficients is generally smaller.
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(a) Low Education
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(b) High Education
Figure 4.6: Monthly Event Study - Education Level.
Summing up, the reduction in abortions appears to be operating mainly through
a reduction in unplanned pregnancies, plausibly due to less frequent sexual inter-
course. Conventional wisdom suggests that younger and/or unmarried women are
most likely to have unplanned pregnancies and this group may be driving the drop
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in abortions. However, Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 show that the effect on abortions
in lesser educated and married women is higher than among unmarried and high
educated women. We offer two additional pieces of evidence as to why this may
be the case. First, the incidence of unplanned pregnancy among married women is
non-trivial. As documented by Castiglioni et al. (2001), 13% of childless married
women in Italy report the occurrence of an unwanted pregnancy; this number rises
to 30% and 68% for married women with one child and two or more children, re-
spectively. As Table 4.6 shows, the abortion rate for this group is also non-trivial
(16.09%), far higher than can be explained by abortion on medical grounds i.e. risks
to maternal health or issues with the foetal health. Second, as we show later, mar-
ried women appear to be the most responsive to papal visits. They show a bigger
jump in religiosity during papal visits as compared to unmarried women.
The reduction in unplanned pregnancies appears to persist for up to 11 months
after the Pope Events since abortions are reduced up to 12 months after the visit.
However, as Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 show, the effect diminishes substantially after
the 9th month.
4.6 Live-Births
The results presented in the previous section indicate a large drop in the number of
abortions, which seems to be concentrated among low educated and married women.
All else equal, this should translate into a fairly large increase in the number of births.
In order to shed light on this aspect, we next investigate the effect of papal visits
on the number of births.
Births may increase for a number of reasons. First, papal visits which emphasise
the importance of family can increase desired fertility level or induce a forward shift
in fertility as documented in the case of Brazil by Bassi and Rasul (2016). Second,
births may also increase due to reduced access to or usage of contraception. Third,
births may increase due to a reduction in abortions, a fact that we have already
documented above. Any such positive effects are likely to show up in birth rates 8-9
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months after the papal visit. On the other hand, births could also decrease if women
become less likely to engage in sexual intercourse. We have suggested above that
papal visits reduce unplanned pregnancies in which case one would see a decrease in
abortions, and possibly in live births as well (as not all unplanned pregnancies are
terminated). Such effects too are likely to show up 8-9 months after the papal visit.
The net effect on births is an empirical question. In our analysis we use the survey
on live births carried out by the Italian National Institute of Statistics. Until 1996
the ISTAT collected information from the population registers of the municipalities
where the birth events occurred, providing detailed information on the delivery of
the newborn as well as socio-demographic indicators of the parents.
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Figure 4.7: Yearly Live Births - National Counts
The introduction of the law 127/97 in 1997 on administrative simplification has
dramatically changed the data collection process, allowing parents to declare live
births not only at the registers of the municipality where the birth-event took place
but also at the registers of the municipality where parents normally resided. The
immediate application of the law, in the middle of 1997, caused a period of strong
uncertainty which resulted in the underreporting of live-births for the years 1997-
1998, as it can be seen from Figure 4.7. For this reason, we excluded these two years
from the analysis of the live-births events.
We aggregate the number of live-births at the province-quarter of year level.19
19Since not all Italian cities are endowed with hospitals or birthing centres, we did not focus
on cities and towns visited by the Pope in order to estimate the impact of the papal visits more
accurately. For instance, assuming the pope has a positive effect on the number of births, our
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We use an event study methodology to test for an effect on the number of births.
Table 4.7: The impact of the papal Visits on Births - Quarterly
ln(births) ln(births) ln(births) ln(births)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pre2 0.00634 −0.00202 0.00452 −0.00413
(0.0108) (0.0046) (0.0111) (0.0052)
pre1 −0.00299 −0.00968∗ −0.00269 −0.00833
(0.0102) (0.0056) (0.0103) (0.0056)
post0 −0.00395 −0.01012∗ −0.00049 −0.00605
(0.0105) (0.0058) (0.0104) (0.0054)
post1 −0.00069 −0.00106 0.00005 −0.00115
(0.0109) (0.0063) (0.0108) (0.0061)
post2 0.00231 0.00361 −0.00094 0.00039
(0.0096) (0.0049) (0.0095) (0.0050)
post3 0.00074 −0.00026 0.00214 0.00207
(0.0102) (0.0053) (0.0101) (0.0048)
post4 −0.00281 −0.00115 −0.00010 0.00205
(0.0096) (0.0057) (0.0096) (0.0054)
N 12160 12160 12160 12160
R2 0.96322 0.99002 0.96379 0.99052
Province f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year f.e. Yes Yes No No
Calendar Quarters f.e. Yes Yes No No
Quarters f.e. No No Yes Yes
Provincial yearly trends No Yes No No
Provincial quarterly trends No No No Yes
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗,
and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the coefficients and std. errors
relative to the papal visits on the provincial quarterly number of births. Std.
errors are clustered at the provincial level.
Table 4.7 displays the estimates of the effect of papal visits on the quarterly
total number of births. Focusing on the most rigorous specification in column (4),
we fail to find evidence of any significant net effect on births. If the decrease in the
number of abortions was not coupled with a decrease in the number of pregnancies,
we should expect an increase in the number of births. Given the size of the standard
errors relative to the third and fourth quarter presented in Table 4.7, we have the
power to detect an increase of 1%. Since our back of the envelope calculations
estimates would be downward biased if the papal visit took place in a town with no hospitals or
birthing centres.
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suggest births should go up approximately by 3%, we conclude that births are not
responding to the papal visits.
It may be that the positive and negative effects mentioned above largely cancel
each other, or it may be that the effects if any, are relatively small in the case of
Italy.20
4.7 Discussion
The evidence presented so far points to a considerable decrease in the number of
abortions in the Italian provinces starting from the 1st quarter of year following the
papal visits. The effect seems to be especially strong for low educated and married
women across different age groups. As we have argued above, the timing of the
drop in abortions as well as the lack of any discernible increase in live births, both
suggest that papal visits induce a reduction in unplanned pregnancies.
The decrease in abortions could take place through a reduction in the frequency
of sexual intercourse and/or increased use of contraceptives. The latter is rather
implausible since Church doctrine frowns on contraception. Heightened religiosity
around papal visits can temporarily strengthen the dominance the Roman Catholic
Church’s morality exerts on its followers. Two features of the moral code may
be particularly relevant. First, the Church regards sexual intercourse as a sin if
conducted outside sacramental marriage, or, even within wedlock, if deprived of its
procreative function. Therefore, during and after papal visits, couples may eschew
sexual intercourse unless aimed at procreation. Interestingly, our findings suggest
that if this is indeed the case, it is occurring among married women and not among
unmarried women. Second, the Church strongly condemns voluntary termination
of abortions. Papal visits could increase the stigma attached to abortions. While
20For the sake of completeness, we also estimated the impact of the papal visits on the number
of births disaggregated by parity. We did not find any statistically significant effect on the number
of first born infants. We do find a positive and statistically significant effect at the 10% level in
the third quarter following the papal visits on the number of second born (0.099%) and third or
higher born infants (2.11%). These results are broadly consistent with our findings on abortion,
confirming the strong influence exerted by the Pope on married women, i.e those who are more
likely to give birth to second and third or higher infants.
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it is true that we do not find a contemporaneous drop in abortions, that does not
in itself conclusively rule out heightened stigma of abortions as a mechanism. The
cost-benefit calculus around abortion for women who are already pregnant is likely
very different from those who are not yet pregnant. Consider a women who finds
that she has an unplanned pregnancy just around the papal visit. It is plausible that
for most such women, the cost of an unwanted child will continue to outweigh even
the heightened (psychic) cost of abortion. Therefore, the abortion count may not
decrease significantly for several weeks after the papal visit since these abortions are
being scheduled by women who became pregnant before the papal visit. In contrast,
consider women who are not pregnant during the papal visit. They are comparing
the cost of avoiding sexual intercourse with the heightened cost of abortion in case
of an unplanned pregnancy (the perceived cost of abortion would be adjusted by the
perceived risk of becoming pregnant). Many such women may opt to avoid sexual
intercourse to avoid the risk of an unplanned pregnancy, and this effect could be
reinforced if contraceptive usage also declines.
Unfortunately due to lack of data we are not able to explore how the visits of
the Pope may change individuals’ attitudes and belief on abortion, or the frequency
of sexual intercourse and contraceptive usage. Nonetheless, in what follows we offer
indirect evidence on these issues, studying how religious attitudes change in response
to the papal visits, documenting an increase in church attendance. This effect seems
to be driven by married women that is also the group where the effect on abortions
is the strongest.
We follow this analysis with an assessment of the possible factors influencing
the decision of the Pope to visit a specific province, testing whether the Pope is
more likely to visit a region that exhibits an increase in the number of abortions
or a decrease in the level of religiosity in the five years preceding the papal event.
Finally, we check if the impact on the number of abortions differs by the identity of
the Pope in office.
99
4.7.1 Religious Attitudes
Women might restore or reinforce their own religiosity, adhering to the principles of
the Catholic morality in response to the papal visits. This, in turn, might lead them
to perceive a heightened stigma attached to abortion, which has been constantly
regarded by the Church as grave evil. According to the Donum Vitae:
“Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves the creative
action of God and it remains for ever in a special relationship with the
Creator, who is its sole end. God alone is the Lord of life from its begin-
ning until its end: no one can under any circumstance claim for him-
self the right directly to destroy an innocent human being” (Ratzinger,
1987).21
We study whether the papal visits have an impact on religiosity, using the re-
peated cross-section annual survey Aspects of daily life made publicly available by
the Italian National Institute of Statistics. From 1993 to 2003 the data were collected
during the month of November, while starting from 2005, it was run in February.22
The survey explores multiple facets of daily life such as individuals’ religious, polit-
ical and social participation, allowing us to conduct the analysis at the regional level,
corresponding to NUTS-2 regions according to the European Union classification.
We focus our analysis on women and exploit the section on religious participation,
where individuals are asked to report the frequency with which they usually go to
Church or other places of worship, and generate a binary indicator taking value 1 if
the individual interviewed goes to Church at least once a week and 0 otherwise. As a
placebo test, we also check if the papal visits have an impact on binary variables such
as participation to volunteering activities, political debates, political party meetings,
trade union meetings and, finally, cultural activities.23
21 The full text is available at: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/
cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.
html.
22 In 2004 the survey did not take place.
23See Appendix C for a detailed description of the dependent variables.
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Hence we run the following probit model:
Pr(Yi,r,a = 1) = Φ(α + βpoper,a + δXi,r,a + θr + θa) (4.3)
Where Yi,r,a is the religiosity indicator or the placebo variables described above
for woman i in region r in year a; the variable of interest, poper,a, takes value 1 if the
respondent lived in a region visited by the pope in the three months before the survey
took place and 0 otherwise; Xi,r,a includes individual observable characteristics such
as age, education, job type and marital status; θr and θa are region and year fixed
effects.
In Table 4.8 we present the results from estimating model (4.3). In Panel A, we
can see that women living in a region visited by the Pope within 3 months from the
date of the interview are more likely to go to church at least once a week and to be
engaged with volunteering activities as compared to those regions where the Pope
did not go. In the following columns we show that the papal visits have no effect on
the participation to political debates (column 3), political party’s meetings (column
4), trade union’s meetings (column 5) and cultural activities (column 6). Notably,
the observed increases in the probability of going to church at least once a week and
of participation in volunteering activities seem to be driven by married (0.078%,
significant at the 10% level) and low educated women (6.40% - significant at the
5% level - which translates into an increase in the probability of being engaged with
volunteering activities by 0.052%).
In Panel B we show the results obtained on re-estimating model (3) by adding
region-specific yearly linear and quadratic trends. The coefficient relative to the
measure of religiosity is now significant at the 10% level in spite of a slight increase
in its size, if compared to the estimate in Panel A. Also in this case, the effect
on religiosity (2.54%, which translates into an increase in the probability of going
to church at least once a week by 0.093%) is positive but statistically significant
at the 1% level when we restrict the analysis to married women. However, the
inclusion of regional specific yearly trends makes the impact of the papal visits
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on the participation to volunteering activities statistically not-significant at any
conventional level. Finally, as in the previous case, participation to political, social
and cultural activities are not affected by the visit of the Pontiff.
Table 4.8: The Impact of the papal Visits on Religiousness and Other Aspects of
Daily Life
Religiosity Volunt. Pol. Party Pol. Debate Trade Union Cult. Act.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Pope Event 0.0221∗∗ 0.0388∗∗ −0.0263 0.0203 0.0070 0.0261
(0.010) (0.018) (0.036) (0.024) (0.019) (0.024)
N 426460 422759 423823 424020 422989 422896
Pope Event - Married Women 0.0210∗ 0.0371 −0.0041 0.0166 0.0018 0.0247
(0.011) (0.023) (0.037) (0.030) (0.024) (0.030)
N 235565 233246 233933 234104 233426 233314
Pope Event - Low Ed. Women 0.0048 0.0640∗∗ −0.0095 0.0187 0.0343 0.0324
(0.017) (0.031) (0.063) (0.040) (0.034) (0.025)
N 259336 257215 257853 257677 257250 257207
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Yearly Trends No No No No No No
Panel B
Pope Event 0.0272∗ 0.0263 0.0061 0.0259 0.0164 0.0337
(0.014) (0.021) (0.041) (0.026) (0.013) (0.023)
N 426460 422759 423823 424020 422989 422896
Pope Event - Married Women 0.0254∗∗∗ 0.0155 0.0334 0.0256 0.0067 0.0277
(0.009) (0.025) (0.049) (0.029) (0.022) (0.028)
N 235565 233246 233933 234104 233426 233314
Pope Event - Low Ed. Women 0.0042 0.0373 0.0239 0.0251 0.0401 0.0363
(0.016) (0.038) (0.060) (0.044) (0.029) (0.024)
N 259336 257215 257853 257677 257207 257207
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Yearly Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the
coefficients and std. errors relative to the papal visits on different indicators. Individual weights provided by ISTAT were applied.
Controls include age, marital status, education level and job type. Std. errors are clustered at the regional level.
4.7.2 Possible factors influencing the papal visits
Is our main result on abortions a causal effect of papal visits? The identification
strategy relies on the precise timing of the event, and in the preferred specifications,
we control for province-specific quadratic time trends. Reassuringly, we find no
discernible effect in the quarters (or months) preceding the event. Hence, we would
argue that our estimates can be credibly inferred as causal.
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Nevertheless, the time and place of a papal visit is unlikely to be random.24
The decision made by the pope to visit a place could be driven by specific factors
e.g. motivated by the desire to reverse a general decline in religiosity among the
population that may show up ad an increasing abortion rate. If so, a papal visit
may coincide with other (unobserved) activities by the Church in that province and
during that time that could be driving our results.
We test whether the pope is more likely to visit a region that exhibits an increase
in the number of abortions or a decrease in the level of religiosity in the five years
preceding the papal event, as presented by equation (4):
Pr(Pope Eventr,a = 1) = Φ(α + β%∆5Zr,a−1 + θr + θa) (4.4)
where Pope Eventr,a is a binary indicator taking value 1 if region r was visited
by the Pope in year a, %∆5Zr,a−1 represents the percentage change in the number
of abortions or in the average religiosity indicator, as defined in Section 4.7.1, over
the 5 years preceding the visit of the Pope in region r, θr and θa are region and year
fixed effects. In its strictest specification, we modify model (4) controlling for the
presence of papal visits occurred in the 5 years preceding the event.
Table 4.9 displays the results from estimating model (4.4). Starting from column
(1) - Panel A - we can see that the growth rate of abortions in the five years preceding
the papal visits to the Italian regions has a negative effect on the probability of a
region hosting the pope. However, the effect is not significant at any conventional
level. The inclusion of region and year fixed effects - column (2) - lowers the size of
the coefficient in absolute value, while it remains statistically insignificant. Finally,
the inclusion of a binary indicator controlling for the occurrence of papal visits in the
5 years preceding the papal event - column (3) - does not change the main findings.
The estimates relative to the percentage change in the reported level of religiosity,
presented in Panel B, confirm that the decision of the Pope to visit a specific region
24As a matter of fact, most papal visits are planned well in advance. See for example the article
by the Archdiocese of Baltimore (N A) at the following link: https://www.archbalt.org/
planning-papal-trips-takes-diplomacy-collaboration-fine-tuning/.
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is not driven by the change in religiosity in the five years before the visit, regardless
of the specification adopted.
Table 4.9: Factors influencing the papal visits
Pope Event Pope Event Pope Event
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A
%∆5Abortionr,a−1 −0.6501 −0.0851 −0.0634
(0.915) (0.237) (0.247)
N 440 360 360
Panel B
%∆5Religiosityr,a−1 −0.5518 −0.3925 −0.5825
(1.410) (2.092) (2.077)
N 247 126 126
Region f.e. No Yes Yes
Year f.e. No Yes Yes
Region visited 5 years No No Yes
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level
by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry in Panel A reports the
coefficients and std. errors relative to the percentage change in the
number of abortions over the 5 years preceding the visit of the Pope
in region r on the the papal visits indicator for region r in year a.
Each entry in Panel B reports the coefficients and std. errors relative
to the percentage change in the average reported religiosity over the
5 years preceding the visit of the Pope in region r on the the papal
visits indicator for region r in year a. Std. errors are clustered at the
regional level.
4.7.3 Which Pope is more influential?
In this section we check if the effect on the number of abortions differs by the identity
of the Pope in office. In order to do so, we disaggregate the sample into two parts,
according to the length of reign of John Paul II and Benedict XVI, respectively.
In Figure 4.8 we graph the estimates from the most stringent specification ad-
opted for model (2), which includes province-specific monthly trends. The negative
effect on the number of pregnancy interruptions seems to be driven by John Paul
II’s papacy. In contrast, the impact of the visits of Pope Benedict XVI on abor-
tions, positive from the 3rd to the 7th month after the papal trip, is not statistically
significant at any conventional level.
Since the two Popes spanned different eras, this difference in the effects on abor-
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tion may simply reflect a long run decline in religiosity and respect for the Pope
within Italian society. However, it is worth noting that there was a substantial drop
in trust among Italians in Pope Benedict XVI as compared to Pope John Paul II.
In Appendix C - Figure C.4, we report the results of the survey representative at
the national level conducted in 2007 by Demos & Pi and Gfk Eurisko (2007). When
asked the question “How much do you trust the Pope?”, only 55.3% of the respond-
ents expressed a strong preference for Benedict XVI against the 77.2% recorded in
2003 for John Paul II. This drop seems to be specific to Benedict XVI, given the
rebound of trust back up to 84% with the election of Francis I, as documented by
Demos & Pi (2015). The different communication strategies adopted by the two
Popes might explain such a drop in trust and, consequently, why people reacted
differently to the visits of the two popes.25
4.8 Conclusions
We find that papal visits to Italian provinces cause approximately a 10% to 20%
decline in the number of abortions, starting in the third month after the visit and
persisting until around the eleventh month after. The effect is strongest among
married women and women with lesser education. We argue that the decline in
25According to public opinion, the main difference between John Paul II and Benedict XVI was
related to the extraordinary capability of the former to reach out to people as individuals with his
speeches (Aziz, 2010).
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abortions is being primarily driven by a reduction in unplanned pregnancies. We
offer two main pieces of evidence for this explanation. First, the timing of the effect
- the drop in abortions is not contemporaneous with papal visits. So, the causal
mechanism is unlikely to be merely an increased aversion to abortion. Instead,
abortions start decreasing about 3 months after the visit which would approximately
coincide with the timing of abortions for unplanned pregnancies that occur during
the papal visit. Second, ceteris paribus, given the abortion rate in Italy, the large
fall in abortions would translate into a measurable increase in the number of live
births. But we fail to find any discernible increase in live births 9 months after the
visit. It is worth noting that other plausible channels would likely boost the birth
rate e.g. through an increase in desired fertility or a shift forward in fertility. Taken
together, the timing of the effect and the lack of an increase in births, point towards
a decline in unplanned pregnancies as the likely explanation.
Papal visits could induce a decline in unwanted pregnancies through a decrease in
the frequency of sexual intercourse not intended for procreation and/or an increase
in the use of contraception. The latter is implausible since the Church has tradition-
ally opposed contraception. Why might women eschew sexual intercourse not aimed
at procreation? Papal visits may lead to heightened religiosity that makes Church
doctrine more salient for a while. Two precepts may play a key role. The first is
the strong stance of the Catholic Church against abortion. This could reduce the
frequency of sexual intercourse as women seek to avoid the risk of unplanned preg-
nancies and the associated dilemma of abortion. Second, the Church has frowned on
sexual intercourse unless it occurs for procreation. We document that papal visits
lead to heightened religiosity, as proxied by weekly church attendance. Notably,
this effect is significant for married women, that is the demographic that shows the
decline in abortions. The saliency of Church doctrine appears to be reinforced by
the messages in Papal speeches that lay a major emphasis on family and to some
extent also criticise abortions.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This thesis analyses the role of political and religious leaders on three relevant is-
sues: the incidence of crime, the decision to migrate and the choice of undergoing an
abortion operation. A vast array of studies has largely documented the importance
of culture, intended as “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious,
and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation” (Guiso
et al., 2006), on several socio-economic outcomes. This work indirectly contributes
to the aforementioned literature, showing how the ethnic background of a politician,
the cultural values adopted and expressed by a specific political party or the diffu-
sion of religious beliefs can shape society.
Chapter 2 adds to the debate started in the 1970s by political scientists and
sociologists on the differences between the set of policies adopted by an African-
American mayor and the measures implemented by a white officer. A decrease
in the number of police employment with respect to a city ruled by a non-black
candidate explains why an increase in the number of motor vehicles theft is observed
in the year following the close electoral contest. One limitation of this paper is
related to the lack of data on the race of the offender, which does not allow to
test whether the observed increase in car theft is driven by a specific ethnic group.
Future research could explore if the decrease in police employment is coupled with
an increase in other types of public spending, such as schooling. If this is the case,
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African-American mayors might tolerate high property crime rates in the short run
against a decrease in property crimes in the long-run.
Chapter 3 asks if foreign citizens with a legal residency permit in Italy relocate
to a different city in response to the election of a mayor affiliated to the Northern
League Party, a far right political movement known for its racist and xenophobic
attitudes. A diminished perception of social inclusion towards non-Italian residents
could explain why foreign citizens relocate to a different city in response to the
election of a mayor affiliated to the Northern League party; on the contrary, the
effect on the number of in-migrants from different Italian cities per 1,000 inhabitants
is not statistically significant at any conventional level. Due to data limitation, this
paper does not explain how undocumented immigrants respond to the election of a
Northern League mayor. On one hand, we could assume that their movements most
likely resemble those of documented immigrants. On the other, we could expect
them to be more responsive to NL mayors.
Finally, Chapter 4 explores the importance of religion in influencing the way
people interact or make important life decisions. In the specific case, the paper
studies how the papal visits to Italian provinces affect the number of abortions, doc-
umenting a strong decrease starting in the third month after the visit and persisting
until around the eleventh month after. The timing of the effect and the absence
of any impact on live births nine months after the visit suggests that the decline
in abortions is driven by a reduction in unplanned pregnancies. A decrease in the
frequency of sexual intercourse not intended for procreation and/or an increase in
the use of contraception could explain such a strong reduction in abortion. Altern-
atively, heightened religiosity, proxied by weekly church attendance, could provide
an alternative mechanism. Although an increase in the use of contraceptives seems
implausible given the strong stance adopted by the Church against contraception,
future research will be aimed at providing direct evidence on whether papal visits
have a direct impact on the sales of contraceptives and on sexual attitudes, condi-
tional on data availability.
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Politicians and religious leaders exert a strong influence on how human beha-
viours are shaped. The themes discussed in this thesis offer a new insight on the
importance of cultural and social values embedded in the identity of political and
religious leaders as key factors to deepen our understanding of economic and social
behaviours.
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Figure A.1: Proportion of mayoral elections with at least one African-American
candidate (1965-2010).
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Figure A.2: Proportion of mayoral elections won by African-American mayors (1965-
2010).
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Figure A.3: Proportion of multi-racial mayoral elections won by African-American
mayors (1965-2010).
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UCR offense definitions
Criminal homicide: a) Murder and non-negligent manslaughter: the wilful (non-
negligent) killing of one human being by another. Deaths caused by negligence,
attempts to kill, assaults to kill, suicides, and accidental deaths are excluded. The
program classifies justifiable homicides separately and limits the definition to: (1)
the killing of a felon by a law enforcement officer in the line of duty; or (2) the killing
of a felon, during the commission of a felony, by a private citizen. b) Manslaughter
by negligence: the killing of another person through gross negligence. Deaths of
persons due to their own negligence, accidental deaths not resulting from gross
negligence, and traffic fatalities are not included in the category Manslaughter by
Negligence.
Forcible rape: The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.
Rapes by force and attempts or assaults to rape, regardless of the age of the victim,
are included. Statutory offences are excluded.
Robbery: The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, cus-
tody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or
by putting the victim in fear.
Aggravated assault: An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the pur-
pose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault usually is
accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to produce death or great
bodily harm. Simple assaults are excluded.
Burglary (breaking or entering): The unlawful entry of a structure to commit
a felony or a theft. Attempted forcible entry is included.
Larceny-theft (except motor vehicle theft): The unlawful taking, carrying,
leading, or riding away of property from the possession or constructive possession
of another. Examples are thefts of bicycles, motor vehicle parts and accessories,
shoplifting, pocket-picking, or the stealing of any property or article that is not
taken by force and violence or by fraud. Attempted larcenies are included. Embez-
zlement, confidence games, forgery, check fraud, etc., are excluded.
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Motor vehicle theft: The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle. A motor
vehicle is self-propelled and runs on land surface and not on rails. Motorboats,
construction equipment, airplanes, and farming equipment are specifically excluded
from this category.
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Table A.1: Violent Crimes per 1,000 inhabitants
US Midwest Northeast South West
Violent Crime Index 4.79 3.80 3.59 6.35 4.50
(3.04) (1.92) (2.27) (3.88) (2.15)
Murder 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.05
(0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11) (0.03)
Rape 0.35 0.35 0.26 0.37 0.41
(0.13) (0.13) (0.06) (0.12) (0.15)
Robbery 1.39 1.05 1.27 1.93 1.08
(1.37) (0.78) (1.17) (1.88) (0.83)
Assault 2.99 2.36 2.03 3.96 2.96
(1.76) (1.17) (1.21) (2.07) (1.43)
N 1428 336 252 476 364
# States (50+1) 12 9 17 13
Violent Crime Index 11.60 11.51 12.50 11.45 10.68
(6.98) (7.78) (7.43) (6.70) (5.58)
Murder 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.14
(0.14) (0.19) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
Rape 0.60 0.73 0.56 0.60 0.49
(0.33) (0.41) (0.34) (0.29) (0.26)
Robbery 4.67 4.43 5.95 4.22 4.29
(3.25) (2.96) (3.95) (2.98) (2.62)
Assault 6.28 6.67 5.84 6.46 5.76
(4.44) (5.98) (3.49) (4.17) (3.08)
N 3125 760 707 1220 438
# Cities 120 32 26 46 16
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from FBI-UCR.
Note: Each entry represents the mean and, in parentheses, standard deviation of the relevant
variables at the state level (top panel) and city level relative to the election sample (bottom panel)
per 1,000 inhabitants. Violent crime index is computed as the sum of murder, rape, robbery and
aggravated assault.
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Table A.2: Property Crimes per 1,000 inhabitants
US Midwest Northeast South West
Property Crime Index 39.10 34.84 31.02 42.50 44.17
(12.07) (8.12) (8.73) (12.71) (12.02)
Burglary 8.73 7.24 6.80 10.50 9.14
(3.56) (2.41) (2.64) (3.57) (3.78)
Larceny 26.50 24.53 20.70 27.75 30.69
(7.51) (4.94) (4.32) (7.61) (7.98)
Motor vehicle theft 3.87 3.07 3.52 4.26 4.34
(2.45) (1.53) (2.52) (2.81) (2.36)
N 1428 336 252 476 364
# States (50+1) 12 9 17 13
Property Crime Index 68.28 67.17 63.31 73.85 62.73
(29.42) (20.43) (42.99) (24.48) (25.40)
Burglary 16.42 17.20 14.39 17.96 14.04
(7.78) (7.15) (8.02) (7.74) (7.28)
Larceny 42.57 40.91 38.72 47.68 37.42
(21.67) (12.50) (35.12) (15.53) (17.12)
Motor vehicle theft 9.30 9.06 10.21 8.22 11.28
(6.66) (6.70) (8.55) (5.54) (5.19)
N 3125 760 707 1220 438
# Cities 120 32 26 46 16
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from FBI-UCR.
Note: Each entry represents the mean and, in parentheses, standard deviation of the relevant variable
at state level (top panel) and city level relative to the election sample (bottom panel) per 1,000
inhabitants. Property crime index is computed as the sum of burglary, larceny and motor vehicle
theft.
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Figure A.4: Baseline Covariates
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Table A.3: Impact of a black mayor on the violent crime index per 1,000 inhab-
itants. - RD estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Linear 3.920∗ −0.481 −3.066∗
(2.09) (2.14) (1.81)
Flexible Linear 4.045∗ −0.098 −1.354
(2.10) (2.17) (1.54)
Quadratic 3.958∗ −0.541 −1.899
(2.13) (2.19) (1.61)
Flexible Quad. 4.132∗ 3.798∗ −0.989
(2.43) (2.03) (1.64)
Cubic 3.208 0.265 −1.967
(2.32) (2.25) (1.63)
Flexible Cubic 5.690∗ 1.883 −1.491
(3.30) (2.59) (1.90)
Quartic 4.602∗ 2.918 −1.113
(2.31) (2.30) (1.51)
Flex Quartic 4.698 1.857 −1.106
(2.83) (2.41) (1.47)
N 112 109 109
Controls N Y Y
Year f.e. N Y Y
State f.e. N Y N
City f.e. N N Y
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the
1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the
election of a black mayor using different functional forms. Controls include city, mayoral
characteristics, year and state or city fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at city
level.
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Table A.4: Impact of a black mayor on the number of murders per 1,000
inhabitants - RD estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Linear 0.016 0.019 −0.029
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Flexible Linear 0.024 0.016 −0.025
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Quadratic 0.024 0.014 −0.025
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Flexible Quad. 0.017 0.078 0.043
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Cubic 0.007 0.032 0.005
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Flexible Cubic 0.092 0.109∗ 0.057
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
Quartic 0.013 0.047 0.026
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Flex Quartic 0.069 0.062 0.036
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
N 127 124 124
Controls N Y Y
Year f.e. N Y Y
State f.e. N Y N
City f.e. N N Y
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at
the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative
to the election of a black mayor using different functional forms. Controls include
city, mayoral characteristics, year and state or city fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at city level.
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Table A.5: Impact of a black mayor on the number of rapes per 1,000 inhab-
itants - RD estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Linear 0.174 −0.036 −0.205∗
(0.12) (0.16) (0.12)
Flexible Linear 0.166 0.019 −0.077
(0.13) (0.15) (0.10)
Quadratic 0.164 0.002 −0.131
(0.13) (0.16) (0.11)
Flexible Quad. 0.168 −0.012 −0.056
(0.17) (0.17) (0.09)
Cubic 0.166 −0.040 −0.185
(0.14) (0.16) (0.12)
Flexible Cubic 0.146 −0.152 −0.050
(0.21) (0.19) (0.12)
Quartic 0.182 0.027 −0.100
(0.15) (0.16) (0.11)
Flex Quartic 0.166 −0.031 −0.105
(0.17) (0.14) (0.11)
N 112 109 109
Controls N Y Y
Year f.e. N Y Y
State f.e. N Y N
City f.e. N N Y
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the
1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the
election of a black mayor using different functional forms. Controls include city, mayoral
characteristics, year and state or city fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at city
level.
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Table A.6: Impact of a black mayor on the number of robberies per 1,000
inhabitants - RD estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Linear 1.919∗ 0.321 −0.172
(1.10) (0.89) (0.84)
Flexible Linear 1.972∗ 0.224 0.133
(1.11) (0.87) (0.69)
Quadratic 1.918∗ 0.142 0.055
(1.11) (0.84) (0.75)
Flexible Quad. 2.040∗ 1.738∗ −0.297
(1.16) (1.00) (0.71)
Cubic 1.521 0.360 −0.017
(1.07) (0.88) (0.78)
Flexible Cubic 2.486 0.856 −1.700
(1.59) (1.25) (1.11)
Quartic 2.236∗∗ 1.306 0.286
(1.08) (1.00) (0.67)
Flex Quartic 2.226∗ 0.727 0.166
(1.29) (1.13) (0.70)
N 127 124 124
Controls N Y Y
Year f.e. N Y Y
State f.e. N Y N
City f.e. N N Y
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the
1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the
election of a black mayor using different functional forms. Controls include city, mayoral
characteristics, year and state or city fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at city
level.
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Table A.7: Impact of a black mayor on the number of aggravated assaults per
1,000 inhabitants - RD estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Linear 0.937 −1.697 −2.190∗∗∗
(1.01) (1.03) (0.68)
Flexible Linear 1.033 −1.599 −1.743∗∗∗
(1.02) (1.08) (0.71)
Quadratic 0.991 −1.725 −1.937∗∗∗
(1.04) (1.05) (0.68)
Flexible Quad. 1.541 0.669 −0.456
(1.27) (1.33) (0.69)
Cubic 0.915 −1.210 −1.680∗∗
(1.25) (1.17) (0.71)
Flexible Cubic 2.084 0.697 −0.208
(1.76) (1.46) (0.79)
Quartic 1.586 0.087 −0.826
(1.16) (1.35) (0.66)
Flex Quartic 1.584 0.090 −0.730
(1.49) (1.40) (0.68)
N 127 124 124
Controls N Y Y
Year f.e. N Y Y
State f.e. N Y N
City f.e. N N Y
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the
1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the
election of a black mayor using different functional forms. Controls include city, mayoral
characteristics, year and state or city fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at city
level.
134
Table A.8: Impact of a black mayor on the property crime index per 1,000
inhabitants - RD estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Linear 12.371 −6.791 −13.075
(8.14) (11.38) (8.14)
Flexible Linear 10.894 −9.478 −8.942
(9.16) (12.26) (6.60)
Quadratic 10.178 −9.894 −10.228
(9.20) (11.68) (7.04)
Flexible Quad. 21.753 8.492 −1.182
(16.28) (11.71) (6.41)
Cubic 13.848 −5.391 −6.648
(11.08) (9.28) (6.18)
Flexible Cubic 30.167 −2.763 −7.051
(25.19) (14.10) (7.41)
Quartic 17.641 0.808 −2.268
(12.05) (10.12) (5.90)
Flex Quartic 20.501 −7.404 −3.224
(19.66) (9.70) (5.22)
N 127 124 124
Controls N Y Y
Year f.e. N Y Y
State f.e. N Y N
City f.e. N N Y
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the
1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the
election of a black mayor using different functional forms. Controls include city, mayoral
characteristics, year and state or city fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at city
level.
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Table A.9: Impact of a black mayor on the number of burglaries per 1,000
inhabitants - RD estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Linear 3.204 0.065 −3.338
(2.69) (2.58) (2.73)
Flexible Linear 3.106 0.184 −2.201
(2.85) (2.49) (2.46)
Quadratic 2.991 −0.034 −2.655
(2.84) (2.50) (2.60)
Flexible Quad. 2.739 3.048 −1.780
(3.53) (2.50) (1.98)
Cubic 2.129 0.555 −2.945
(2.97) (2.23) (2.50)
Flexible Cubic 3.691 1.850 −4.441∗
(4.49) (3.29) (2.41)
Quartic 2.569 1.614 −1.058
(3.25) (2.48) (2.10)
Flex Quartic 2.037 0.472 −1.394
(3.98) (2.62) (2.10)
N 127 124 124
Controls N Y Y
Year f.e. N Y Y
State f.e. N Y N
City f.e. N N Y
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the
1% level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the
election of a black mayor using different functional forms. Controls include city, mayoral
characteristics, year and state or city fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at city
level.
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Table A.10: Impact of a black mayor on the number of larcenies per 1,000 inhab-
itants - RD estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Linear 3.219 −10.128 −13.636∗
(4.86) (10.16) (6.94)
Flexible Linear 1.941 −12.739 −9.643∗
(5.90) (11.18) (5.64)
Quadratic 1.326 −13.005 −10.971∗
(6.02) (10.58) (5.89)
Flexible Quad. 13.556 2.056 −1.275
(12.77) (10.90) (4.90)
Cubic 6.076 −9.424 −7.527
(7.84) (8.36) (4.75)
Flexible Cubic 20.794 −7.804 −3.210
(20.99) (12.47) (6.63)
Quartic 9.208 −4.137 −4.038
(8.61) (9.26) (4.46)
Flex Quartic 12.841 −10.863 −4.360
(15.52) (8.32) (3.84)
N 127 124 124
Controls N Y Y
Year f.e. N Y Y
State f.e. N Y N
City f.e. N N Y
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1%
level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the election of
a black mayor using different functional forms. Controls include city, mayoral characteristics,
year and state or city fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at city level.
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Table A.11: Impact of a black mayor on the number of motor vehicle thefts per
1,000 inhabitants - RD estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Linear 5.948∗∗∗ 3.272∗∗ 3.899∗∗∗
(2.03) (1.39) (1.38)
Flexible Linear 5.847∗∗∗ 3.077∗∗ 2.902∗∗
(2.00) (1.37) (1.22)
Quadratic 5.860∗∗∗ 3.145∗∗ 3.397∗∗∗
(1.99) (1.37) (1.21)
Flexible Quad. 5.458∗∗ 3.388∗∗ 1.873
(2.31) (1.53) (1.80)
Cubic 5.643∗∗ 3.479∗∗ 3.823∗∗∗
(2.12) (1.30) (1.08)
Flexible Cubic 5.682∗ 3.192∗ 0.600
(2.91) (1.81) (2.42)
Quartic 5.864∗∗ 3.331∗∗ 2.828∗∗
(2.24) (1.53) (1.38)
Flex Quartic 5.624∗∗ 2.987∗ 2.530∗
(2.50) (1.62) (1.41)
N 127 124 124
Controls N Y Y
Year f.e. N Y Y
State f.e. N Y N
City f.e. N N Y
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1%
level by ∗∗∗. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the election of
a black mayor using different functional forms. Controls include city, mayoral characteristics,
year and state or city fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at city level.
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Figure B.1: Google Searches in USA: Moving to Canada - Super Tuesday
Source: Google Trends.
Figure B.2: Google Searches in the UK: Moving to France - Brexit
Source: Google Trends.
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Figure B.3: Italian Regions - Election Data
Source: Author’s elaborations.
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Figure B.4: Continuity of the running variable
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(a) Total Population (b) Foreign Population (c) Italian Population
(d) ln(income) (e) ln(firms) (f) Surf (km2)
(g) Altitutde (h) Mayor Gender (i) Mayor Age
(j) Mayor Education (k) Mayor Incumbency
Figure B.5: Baseline Covariates
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Table B.1: Internal validity test - Discontinuity in the covariates
β N h
(se)
Tot Pop. −2664.4 89 0.07
(2747.6)
Foreign Pop. 210.91 100 0.082
(239.81)
Italian Pop. −2878.1 85 0.069
(2627.3)
ln(Income pc in 2010e) 0.031 97 0.080
(0.08)
ln(Firms in 2012) −0.510 84 0.068
(0.53)
Area (km2) 8.596 110 0.092
(9.08)
Altitude 65.624 123 0.110
(89.71)
Mayor gender (male =1) −0.149 99 0.076
(0.23)
Mayor age −3.999 101 0.083
(5.04))
Mayor education 0.058 123 0.105
(0.27)
Mayor incumbent 0.228 103 0.085
(0.17)
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the ISTAT and the Historical Election
Archive.
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1%
level by ***. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the election
of an NL mayor using the method developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level.
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Table B.2: Internal validity test - Discontinuity in the covariates
β N h
(se)
Tot Pop. −569.23 274 0.280
(1384.2)
Foreign Pop. 226.89 298 0.328
(145.48)
Italian Pop. −891.97 272 0.276
(1278.9)
ln(Income pc in 2010e) 0.060 292 0.320
(0.06)
ln(Firms in 2012) −0.284 267 0.272
(0.31)
Area (km2) −0.689 323 0.370
(4.56)
Altitude 37.202 352 0.442
(50.25)
Mayor gender (male =1) −0.177 288 0.304
(0.13)
Mayor age −3.853 305 0.336
(2.86)
Mayor education −0.116 348 0.422
(0.14)
Mayor incumbent 0.040 307 0.340
(0.07)
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the ISTAT and the Historical Election
Archive.
Note: Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1%
level by ***. Each entry reports the RD coefficients and std. errors relative to the election
of an NL mayor using the method developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level.
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Figure C.1: Papal Visits - Italian Provinces
Source: Author’s elaborations.
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Figure C.2: Media Coverage - papal visits to Bari - February 1984
Figure C.3: Media Coverage - papal visits to Palermo - October 2010
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Figure C.4: Trust in Pope Benedict XVI vs Pope John Paul II
Source: Demos & Pi - Gfk Eurisko (2007) - Gli italiani e la religione
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Dependent Variables - “Aspetti della Vita Quotidiana”
Survey
• Religiousness
– How often do you go to the Church or other place of worship?
∗ At least once a week (1)
∗ Less than once a week (0)
• Volunteering
– Did you participate to volunteer associations’ meetings in the last 12
months?
∗ Yes (1)
∗ No (0)
• Political Party
– Did you participate to political party meetings in the last 12 months?
∗ Yes (1)
∗ No (0)
• Political Debate
– Did you participate to political debates in the last 12 months?
∗ Yes (1)
∗ No (0)
• Trade Union
– Did you participate to trade union’s meetings in the last 12 months?
∗ Yes (1)
∗ No (0)
150
• Cultural Activity
– Did you participate to cultural associations’ meetings in the last 12
months?
∗ Yes (1)
∗ No (0)
